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RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRADE: MEETING THE PARIS
AGREEMENT’S GOALS THROUGH STRATEGIC COMPLIANCE
(FORTHCOMING, MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF LAW SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 2020-2021)
Lisa Benjamin*
ABSTRACT
Trade and climate change are at a crossroads. For the world to meet the long-term
temperature goals under the Paris Agreement, all nations must actively engage with greening
their economies and energy supplies. The fastest way to achieve this is to allow, or even
encourage, green industrial policies which incentivize the manufacture and diffusion of
renewable energy. These policies often include elements such as renewable portfolio standards,
requirements for mixing biofuels with gasoline, as well as local content requirements. These
types of policies are particularly important and relevant for developing countries as they aim to
reduce poverty, improve economic development and mitigate the adverse effects of climate
change.
Where these policies include protectionist measures such as local content requirements, they
violate basic World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and principles of non-discrimination.
Emerging economies in the developing world have been on the losing end of most of the recent
energy disputes at the WTO, but are an increasingly large site of greenhouse gas emissions
globally. Given the existing friction between the trade and climate change regimes, countries are
likely to engage in strategic compliance in order to preserve their domestic policy aims, at least
in the short term.
*
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One of the challenges facing policy makers in emerging economies at the intersection of
climate and trade is how to dramatically increase manufacture, dissemination and export of
renewable energy technology through green industrial policy making without violating trade
rules. This article proposes a two-step advance to this problem. First it highlights a broader
range of defences under Article XX available to emerging economies connected with the climate
crisis. Second, it offers a set of general principles that the WTO‟s own dispute settlement
mechanism could introduce in the context of climate change. These solutions ultimately have
broader import than to developing countries (the locus of the case studies), as developed
countries engage in their own industry policy battles and consider implementing green new
deals.
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INTRODUCTION
Trade conflicts have burgeoned under the Trump Administration, particularly with China.
President Trump imposed tariffs on a number of imports, including solar cells, and is engaging in
trade conflicts with both allies and rivals of the United States in an attempt to revive ailing
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domestic manufacturing industries.1 At the same time, U.S. states are implementing their own
policies to incentivize the transition to renewable energy. Imagine a state allowed its power
company to pay its customers for electricity those customers produced using renewable energy.
The state then provided the power company credits against its public utility commission taxes
equal to the amounts it paid customers for renewable energy. Those customers could obtain
additional incentive payments if they used solar inverters, solar modules, stirling converters or
wind blades manufactured in that state to produce their renewable energy. Or imagine that a state
provided a tax incentive for production of ethanol to be blended in gasoline, and required a
minimum percentage of that ethanol to be produced from products originating from that state.
Both of these programs incentivize the manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy, and
assist the United States in tackling the problem of climate change. In fact, these are both
programs from Washington (the Renewable Energy Cost Recovery Incentives Payment Program)
and Montana (Tax Incentive for Ethanol Production), which were both held to violate trade rules
in June 2019.2
This example demonstrates that the WTO and the new climate regime under the Paris
Agreement have conflicting aims. The WTO focuses on free trade, non-discrimination and
disciplining domestic protectionism, with limited policy exceptions provided to countries under
Article XX of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Article XX provides
countries with several exceptions to allow discriminatory treatment which would otherwise
violate WTO rules, including on the basis of environmental reasons (Article XX(g)) or health
reasons (Article XX(b)). The Paris Agreement aims to incentivize ambitious action by all
countries at the national level to keep long term temperatures increases well below 2°C above
1

Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, A Blueprint for a New American Trade Policy 8 (Dec. 2018).
Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector WTO Doc.
WT/DS510/R (adopted 27 June 2019). The United States has appealed the decision.
2
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pre-industrial levels (with an aspirational goal of 1.5°C) in order to avoid catastrophic climate
change. Countries contribute to these collective goals through the submission of nationally
determined contributions, which are supposed to reflect decreasing greenhouse gas emissions
over time. The trade and climate change regimes exist within silos, but the systemic nature of
climate change forces a reconsideration of the nexus between trade and climate change. Climate
action at the national level is often implemented by developed and developing countries through
green industrial policy making around energy, which as illustrated above, often involves both
environmental and economic and developmental objectives. Many of these policies have been
on the losing end of disputes at the WTO, but arguably should be allowed under Article XX
exceptions. These energy disputes demonstrate global wrangling to achieve economic dominance
in clean energy industries - all of these disputes fall against a backdrop where liberalising trade
in clean energy is grounded in comparative advantage theory: removing barriers to international
trade in theory would allow the most efficient, competitive producers of clean energy to prevail. 3
The first (albeit tentative) phase of the bilateral trade agreement between the United
States and China signals a further decline in multilateral trade relationships under the WTO.4
Bilateral, regional and mega regional trade arrangements have over the years led to the declining
influence of the WTO. This decline, combined with the blocking by the United States of the
appointment of appellate judges in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), 5 mean that the

3

Christopher M. Dent, Clean Energy Trade Governance: Reconciling Trade Liberalism and Climate
Interventionism?, 23 NEW POL. ECON.728, 730 (2017), 3.
4
Don Lee and Alice Su, U.S. and China agree to partial trade deal, but few details are released, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Dec 13, 2019; Ryan Woo and Jeff Mason, China, U.S. sign initial trade pact but doubts and tariffs linger
REUTERS Jan 14, 2019; Susanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das an Michael Mehling, The Trade System and
Climate Action: Ways Forward Under the Paris Agreement CLIMATE STRATEGIES 4, 30 (Oct. 2016); Kathleen
Clausen, Dispute Settlement Under the Next Generation of Free Trade Agreements 46 (2018) GA. J. INTL AND COMP
LAW 661, 615. The first phase of the agreement contains a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism designed to avoid
disputes being submitted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
5
Jens Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appeals to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally
Justified? Sui Generis (Berlin, 2019) (arguing that US arguments of judicial overreach and disregard of the WTO
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ability (and relevance) of the DSM to adjudicate multilateral trade disputes is now questionable. 6
These developments may lead developing (and developed) countries to engage in or continue
existing strategic compliance (delaying compliance until trade remedies are imminent) or
convenient compliance (complying only when it is convenient and benefits existing domestic
policies). In the alternative, countries may simply ignore the outcome of disputes and never
comply, and instead employ more domestic protectionist measures to implement and entrench
domestic green industrial policy making.
Given that the outcomes of most of the DSM disputes on energy have been negative for
developing and developed countries so far, in the short term strategic compliance may not be so
detrimental for the climate if countries implement urgent and progressive renewable energy
policies. In the longer term, if the WTO and its DSM is reinvigorated, a more synergistic
relationship between trade and climate change is needed in order to reduce the existing friction
between these two regimes. Part of a revised relationship between trade and climate change
could be achieved jurisprudentially through the DSM. The existing dispute mechanism has the
flexibility to accomodate emerging global issues and cater its jurisprudence accordingly, within
the limits of the language of the WTO agreements. In fact, Article XX has previously been
subject to progressive interpretation by the DSM, and there is no reason why this approach
cannot be adopted in disputes involving renewable energy.
It is at the nexus of climate change and trade that this paper focuses on emerging
economies in the developing world through the lens of energy disputes at the WTO. The actions

rules by appellate Body judges used to block appointments to the Appellate Body since mid-2017 are not legally
justifiable). As of December 2019 the number of Appellate Body judges dropped to 1, below the 3 required for a
quorum. See also „Members reiterate joint call to launch selection process for Appellate Body members‟ 22
November, 2019 available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_22nov19_e.htm.
6
Although a number of countries have agreed to an ad-hoc workaround the current stasis, see Beatriz Rios, China,
WTO Members join EU‟s ad-hoc appellate body in Davos, EURACTIV.COM (Jan. 24, 2020).
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of these countries in the context of both climate change and energy are critical to global energy
transitions and climate stabilisation efforts anticipated by the Paris Agreement. Emerging
economies such as BASIC7 countries are introducing public stimulus programmes and making
investments in infrastructure, rural development and urban planning in order to achieve green
growth.
This paper takes a novel approach by examining the strategies of emerging economies at
the WTO across a set of disputes which fall into two main categories: renewable energy and
biofuels. The record of success of developing countries in these disputes is mixed, although
largely unsuccessful both in law and „in fact‟ (in terms of trade remedies). This paper will
suggest some understandings of why this may be the case, based on inherent inadequacies of the
trade system to accommodate climate objectives, and how these inadequacies could be
overcome.
While this paper focuses on emerging economies, the analysis has relevance for
developed economies as well as they consider their own form of domestic protectionism, green
industrial policy making and green new deals.8 The nature of energy disputes has shifted over
time - India recently won a panel decision regarding renewable energy regulations in California,
Minnesota, Texas, Montana, Michigan, Washington and Delaware found to be in violation of
7

BASIC countries are four newly industrialized countries which still self-identify as developing countries under
most international treaties: Brazil, South Africa, India and China. Defining the groupings of non-industrialized
countries in the world has been subject to much debate. The terms „Third World‟, „developing world‟ and „global
South‟ originated in different periods and have been contested in terms of their appropriateness and accuracy.
Today, the term „global South‟ and „global North‟ have become the favoured option by scholars and policy-makers,
based on an earlier „North–South‟ distinction of the 1980s with the prefix „global‟ clarifying that this is not a purely
geographical categorisation of the world, but one based on economic inequalities, see S.H. Chant & C. McIlwaine,
GEOGRAPHIES OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY : AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Edward Elgar:
2009), 6 and 11. This paper will continue to use the terms developed and developing countries as these terms are
identified and used in the WTO system.
8
For example, see House of Representatives Resolution (109) -116th Congress (2019-2020) –Recognizing the duty
of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal; European Commission, COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL

(11TH DECEMBER 2019) COM(2019) 640.
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WTO rules.9 So energy policies of developed countries are also becoming subject to the DSM.
Given the largely negative outcomes of these disputes for renewable energy and in particular the
problem of discriminatory local content requirements, a „pause‟ in these disputes due the decline
of the DSM may be beneficial for the climate, providing policy space to countries to use local
content requirements and other protectionist policies to ramp up climate action and green energy
development. Domestic protectionist policies, including subsidies, if well designed, could (and
already have)10 decrease costs and increase the production and diffusion of renewable energy
both domestically and around the world, including in other developing countries. Assuming the
WTO and the DSM continue to operate in the longer term, energy disputes are only likely to
increase and so an improved relationship between the WTO and the Paris Agreement will be
needed. Countries can (and do) unilaterally impose countervailing and other duties which
increase the cost of imports of renewable energy and hamper its diffusion, and so a more
comprehensive approach to energy and climate concerns at the WTO will be needed if we are to
meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.11
While legislative reform at the WTO has been suggested and would certainly be a more
comprehensive approach, this paper suggests a partial solution through a two-fold jurisprudential
approach, assuming the appellate function of the DSM is revived. In the first instance, existing
disputes can provide lessons to developing countries on how to better cater and craft their
9

United States – Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector supra note 2. Meyer argues that it is in
fact developed countries that are clamoring for policy space in the trading system as they are unable to provide
direct subsidies via a centralized state-based banking system as China can, see Timothy Meyer The Law and Politics
of Socially Inclusive Trade UNIV. OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 33, 42 (2019).
10
IRENA, A New World The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation (2019); REN21, Renewables 2019 Global
Status Report (2019).
11
Brian Eckhouse, Ari Natter Chris Martin, Trump‟s Tariffs on Solar Mark Biggest Blow to Renewables Yet,
BLOOMBERG: CLIMATE CHANGED (Jan. 23, 2018, 1:38 AM PST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201801-22/trump-taxes-solar-imports-in-biggest-blow-to-clean-energy-yet; Graeme Wearden, Markets Fall as China-US
Tariff Spat Fuels Trade War Fears – Business Live, THE GUARDIAN (April 3, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/apr/03/markets-fall-china-us-tariffs-trade-war-ftse-dow-spotifylisting-business-live; Doug Palmer, Trump‟s Global Trade War, POLITICO, (June 3, 2018),
https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-duties-steel-aluminum-global-trade-war.
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domestic policies to more easily align with existing defences available under Article XX in the
context of the climate crisis. At the same time, Article XX should be reinterpreted by the Panels
and Appellate Bodies to allow more policy space for countries to implement and diffuse green
energy technology (even with local content requirements), and so reduce the friction between the
WTO and the Paris Agreement.
This paper is structured as follows: in section one, a brief overview of the WTO, DSM
and Article XX is provided. In section two, the relationship between energy, trade and climate
change is expanded upon, paving the way, in section three, for a historical background of the
relationship between energy and the WTO and green industrial policy making. Section four will
analyse the strategies used by India and China in renewable energy disputes, and Argentina and
Indonesia in biofuels disputes. India included local content requirements for solar panels as part
of its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, and China provided subsidies to state owned
enterprises manufacturing wind towers and solar panels. Argentina and Indonesia imposed
export duties on locally produced raw materials used to manufacture biofuels in order to make
their domestically produced biofuels cheaper on the international markets. The paper will
conclude with a focus specifically on how existing defences under Article XX are being relied
upon in these disputes, and evaluate the circumstances under which these countries could tighten
their domestic policies in the context of the climate emergency to more closely align with Article
XX defences such as XX(b) and (g). It will also advocate for a more climate-friendly
interpretation of Article XX by the DSM.
I. THE WTO, DSM AND ARTICLE XX

9
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The WTO was formally established as an institution in 1995, although its historical roots
go back much further in time.12 The agreement establishing the WTO includes, in its annexes, a
number of agreements referred to as „covered agreements‟, although they are not stand-alone
agreements.13 Countries accede to the WTO as a single-package deal, agreeing to all of the
multilateral covered agreements, including the provisions of the agreement establishing the
WTO, the multilateral agreements in Annex 1, and the agreements in Annex 2 (the Dispute
Settlement Understanding) and 3 (the Trade Policy Review Mechanism).14 Annex 1 is divided
into three parts, with the first containing agreements on the trade in goods, including the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT 1994) and its related texts including the Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA), the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures agreement (SCM), AntiDumping Agreement (ADA) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS). The second part of Annex 1 includes the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), and the third part includes the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).
This paper is concerned with disputes which involve the GATT 1994, AoA, SCM and TRIMS
agreements.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is a covered agreement contained in
Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement. It is considered to be the „linchpin‟ of the entire trading
system, and one of the greatest achievements of the Uruguay Round which led to the agreement
12

The precursor to the WTO was the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs agreed in 1947 (GATT 1947),
although Jackson notes that the principles of the multilateral trade relationships were established as a result of
bilateral friendship, Commerce and navigation treaties between independent nations in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, resulting in the 1890 treaty Concerning the Creation of an International Union for the
Publication of Customs Tariffs, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (MIT Press: 1997) 2nd Ed, 35.
The provisions of GATT 1947 evolved from U.S. bilateral trade agreements (JACKSON, 37). Claussen notes that
trade provisions are adapted and evolve from other trading agreements and in the labour and environmental fields
can achieve normative convergence, Claussen supra note 4.
13
Jackson supra note 12, at 46.
14
The multilateral agreements are contained in Annex 1 of the WTO Charter. Annex 2 contains the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. Annex 3 contains the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. There are only a few plurilateral
agreements which are part of the WTO including on civil aircraft and government procurement contained in Annex
4. These are not part of the package of covered agreements and countries can choose whether or not to join them.

10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568192

of the WTO.15 It is a unified system which adjudicates disputes between parties under any of the
multilateral agreements. It provides the right of any government to have a panel process and
panel decision initiated, as well as an appellate procedure. The dispute settlement body (or DSB)
administers the entire process, and the WTO system eliminates the ability of parties to block
adoption of panel or appellate body decisions, providing for a level of “automaticity” 16 and
therefore certainty. Together the system is referred to here as the dispute settlement mechanism
or DSM.
A panel consists of three independent trade experts, and the Appellate Body consists of a
permanent body of seven judges, with a minimum of three required for the body to operate.17
Once a dispute has been adjudicated and appealed, the DSM also provides for a remedies phase
of the dispute. While voluntary compensation can be provided under Article 22 of the DSU, this
has never been used. Instead, countries will usually seek authorization to suspend concessions or
other obligations under the same or another WTO covered agreement. This can include imposing
tariffs equal to any benefits lost as a result of the other country‟s noncompliance. The level of
suspension can also be subject to arbitration under the DSM, although the remedy phase of the
DSM can be lengthy.
The United States started to block the appointment of new appellate judges in 2018, with
terms of two of the remaining three judges expiring on 10th December 2019. This move is partly
a reaction to the barrage of disputes being initiated against the U.S. due to its tariff wars, and
partly due to disappointment by the existing U.S. administration with the outcome of previous

15

Jackson, supra note 12, at 124.
Id., 125.
17
The appellate body must only review issues of law covered by the panel, see Article 17.6 of the DSU.
16
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disputes.18 The inability of the appellate body to function nullifies the appellate procedure of the
system, and could signal the „beginning of the end‟ of the DSM, an increase in tariffs, and
trading relations based on power as opposed to multilaterally agreed rules. 19 Despite this new
controversy, the DSM has not been without its flaws, and has been criticised in the past
specifically in relation to its inaccessibility by developing countries.20
There are a number of possible exceptions to the provisions of WTO covered agreements,
including waivers agreed by the parties under GATT Article XXV, exceptions for developing
countries in Article XVIII, and most importantly for this paper, general exceptions included
under Article XX of the GATT 1994. Article 3.5 of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reiterates the language of Article XX of the GATT, and the Paris
Agreement is silent on trade, and so parties largely depend on trade provisions to regulate their
domestic climate and energy related policies.21 There is no equivalent to the DSM for
environmental matters.22 Significant precedent exists for progressive interpretations of Article
XX under the DSM in the context of trade and the environment, and this history of the DSM
demonstrates the „generative quality‟ of that body, 23 and its ability to adapt to changing global
circumstances.

18

Tom Miles, U.S. blocks WTO judge reappointment as dispute settlement crisis looms REUTERS (27 Aug 2018)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-idUSKCN1LC19O.
19
DW, WTO judge blockage could prove „the beginning of the end‟ DW (10 Dec 2019)
https://www.dw.com/en/wto-judge-blockage-could-prove-the-beginning-of-the-end/a-51613082.
20
Chad P Bown and Bernard Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases:
Engaging the Private Sector 8(5) SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL 861 (2005).
21
DANIEL BODANSKY, JUTTA BRUNNEE, AND LAVANYA RAJAMANI, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW
(OUP:2017) 347.
22
CHRIS WOLD, SANFORD GAINES AND GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT LAW AND POLICY 83 (2nd ed
Carolina Academic Press: 2011).
23
ANDREAS KALASEN, TRADE: GRIDLOCK AND RESILIENCE IN BEYOND GRIDLOCK, POLITY, 74 (Thomas Hale and
David Held eds. 2017).
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A. Article XX – General Exceptions
Non-discrimination has been called the „cardinal legal principle of the GATT‟. 24 The
principle appears most prominently in the most favoured nation clause (under Article I) and
national treatment clause (under Article III) of the GATT. Under most favoured nation, no
member state of the WTO can afford preferential treatment to a product of one WTO member
unless it offers that same treatment to the „like‟ products all WTO members. 25 National treatment
is the most relevant in terms of subsidies for renewable energy. Under these provisions, a WTO
member cannot treat its own domestic product more favourably than any „like‟ product of any
other WTO member.26
Article XX provides countries with a number of general exceptions which can exempt
actions which violate most favoured nation or national treatment principles. 27 Application of
Article XX involves a two-step process. The measures taken by a country must fall under one of
the sub-categories of Article XX, and then must meet the requirements of the opening paragraph
(or „chapeau‟) of Article XX.

24

WOLD et al., supra note 22, at 32.
Article I of the GATT states that no advantage or privilege can be offered, and there is extensive jurisprudence at
the DSM of what constitutes a „like‟ product. In the environmental realm, whether product and production methods
constitute a „like‟ product is a difficult area; see for example CHRISTINE R. CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION
METHODS (PPMS) IN WTO LAW: INTERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOALS (CUP: 2011); WOLD et al., supra note 22
at 180.
26
See Article III of the GATT. The jurisprudence on „like‟ products under both MFN and National Treatment have
been provided with interchangeable applicability.
27
The paper provides a brief overview only of cases on Article XX, while acknowledging that there is significant
literature on the application and interpretation of Article XX in the context of climate change (see for example,
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER,STEVE CHARNOVITZ &JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 86 (2009); Luca Rubini & Ingrid Jegou, Who‟ll Stop the Rain? Allocating Emissions
Allowances for Free: Environmental Policy, Economics, and WTO Subsidy Law,1 TRANS.ENVTL. L. 325 (2012);
TRACEY EPPS &ANDREW GREEN, RECONCILING TRADE AND CLIMATE: HOW THE WTO CAN
HELPADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 144–47(2010); Thomas Cottier & Tetyana Payosova, Common Concern
and the Legitimacy of the WTO in Dealing with Climate Change, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
CHANGE AND TRADE LAW 28 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2017); Michael Hertel, Climate-Change-Related
Trade Measures and Article XX: Deﬁning Discriminationin Light of the Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities,45J. WORLD TRADE 653 (2011); Jacob Werksman & Trevor Houser, Competitiveness, Leakage
and Comparability: Disciplining the Use of Trade Measures Under a Post-2012 Climate Agreement 4 (2008).
25
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Trade and environment disputes at the WTO faced a number of criticisms in the 1990s,
largely as a result of the Tuna/Dolphin28 dispute where the United States attempted to impose
environmental restrictions on fisheries imports by placing an embargo on tuna imports which
were caught using purse seine nets which lead to high levels of dolphin mortality. WTO
decisions in this area fuelled protests at the 1999 Ministerial Conference in Seattle, with
protesters wearing costumes of turtles and dolphins. 29 Developing countries saw these
environmental requirements as „eco-imperialism‟ 30 which served to hamper their exports, and
protectionism by developed countries clothed in environmental regulations. Perhaps in response
to these criticisms, the DSM developed a more environmentally-friendly approaches under
Articles XX(b) and XX(g).
The two main „environmental‟ subcategories under Article XX are XX(b) and XX(g).
Article XX(b) provides an exception for measures „necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health…..‟. Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures „relating to conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption.‟ There are several other subcategories of Article XX
which have been invoked in energy disputes, including Article XX(d) which exempts measures
„necessary‟ to comply with laws or regulations, and Article XX(j) which exempts measures
aimed at protecting products which are locally in short supply. The language in the subcategories
differs significantly, with some measures required to be „necessary‟ (eg XX(b) and (d)), and
28

United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Panel Report, DS29/R (June 16, 1994, unadopted) and
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R. There are a number of
iterations of these disputes.
29
While part of the protests concerned DSM decisions concluding that the US restrictions were discriminatory,
much of the protests concerned the negative impacts of free trade generally, workers‟ rights, sustainability,
environmental as well as social issues, see for example Seattle Municipal Archives which collected news articles
regarding the protests at http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-documentlibraries/world-trade-organization-protests-in-seattle.
30
Bodansky et al. supra note 21, at 335.
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others must just „relate to‟ the domestic measure (eg XX(g)). There are different applicable tests
for these subcategories. For example, in order to be „necessary‟ under Article XX(b), a country
must not have alternative measures which are reasonably available and not inconsistent with the
GATT.31 Article XX(g) requires corollary activity of restrictions on domestic production and
consumption, requiring that countries display some domestic environmental activity.

B. Article XX(b)
In the area of health under Article XX(b), the DSM has displayed the most interpretive
deference to domestic policy making. Two disputes which concerned an import ban on asbestos
by France32 and an import ban on tyres by Brazil33 provided generous interpretations of Article
XX(b). In these cases, domestic policies designed to reduce risk from asbestos fibres and
mosquito borne diseases respectively were held to fall within the subcategory of Article XX(b),
even though alternatives were available. The Appellate Body afforded significant deference to
domestic policy making, specifically recognizing that complex public health or environmental
problems such as climate change, must be tackled with multifaceted and comprehensive policies
with interacting measures, the results of which may only manifest over time. 34 The import ban on
retreaded tyres was considered in the broader context of Brazil‟s comprehensive strategy to deal
with waste tyres, and the Appellate Body determined that the import ban did make a material
contribution to Brazil‟s overall domestic objectives.35 In Brazil-Taxation, the Panel specifically
articulated that a policy to reduce carbon emissions would be covered by XX(b), as it would be a
31

United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Panel Report, DS29/R (June 16, 1994, unadopted) para 5.35
and United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Appellate Body WT/DS2/10/Add.7,
para 6.26-6.29.
32
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products WT/DS135/R.
33
Brazil – Measuring Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres WT/DS332/R.
34
Id. at para 151.
35
Id. at para 154.
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policy designed to protect human life or health. 36 While the elements of a renewable energy
policy targeted at preserving a stable climate are likely to qualify under XX(b), economic
elements under the same policy such as local content requirements may not be considered a
legitimate objective,37 and may not be considered „necessary‟ as set out below.
Existing jurisprudence points to three elements which are relied upon to determine
whether a measure is „necessary‟ under XX(b). These are whether the measure is apt to make a
„material contribution‟ to the purpose of the policy. 38 A genuine relationship of ends and means
should be identified for this element.39 Therefore both the renewable energy policy and any
protectionist economic measures within it should materially contribute to emissions reductions.
This is where empirical evidence of reduced costs and increased dissemination from past local
content or other economic elements could be persuasive, even if these occurred over time. The
Brazil-Retreaded Tyres case gave specific latitude to complex public health or environmental
problems such as climate change, stating that the benefits of policies may only manifest over
time.40
The second element of the test of necessity is whether the measure is proportional to the
values the policy seeks to protect – the more vital the interests or values, the easier it would be to
pass the necessity test.41 The urgency and global attention focused on climate change, the
increasing public health emergencies associated with the impacts of climate change, including
increased air pollution, combined with multilateral and almost universal action to ratify the Paris

36

Brazil-Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges WT/DS472/R para 7.880.
Michael Mehling et al., Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action 113(3) AJIL 433,
465 (2019).
38
Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, supra note 33, para 151, 210.
39
Id., para 145.
40
Id. para 31; Mehling et al. supra note 37, 465.
41
EC-Asbestos supra note 32, para 172.
37
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Agreement, suggests that a policy targeted at addressing climate change would pass this second
element.42
The third element requires that there is no alternative measure which would achieve the
same aim but in a less trade restrictive manner. 43 Here the burden shifts to the complainant in a
dispute. The Appellate Body has been careful to consider practice and economic needs of
developing countries in the context of this third element. In Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, expensive
technological fixes such as tyre recycling facilities were not reasonably available, and therefore
the domestic policy of promoting domestic retreading of tyres was deemed to be „necessary‟
under Article XX(b). The economic and administrative realities of countries were carefully
considered by the DSM in the context of the comprehensiveness and different components of the
policy. It is possible that connecting local content requirements or other protectionist measures to
overall policy objectives of reducing cost and increasing (local) dissemination of renewable
energy, combined with the economic and poverty eradication imperatives and air quality crises in
many developing countries, could be persuasive here. Again, empirical evidence connecting the
economic elements of a domestic policy to increased manufacturing and dissemination of
renewable energy technology would have to be put forward, and combat any other economic
arguments such as simply importing cheap renewable energy technology may achieve the same
domestic policy objectives.
C. Article XX(g)
Article XX(g) has its own unique set of tests. In the second iteration of the Shrimp/Turtle
dispute, the Appellate Body confirmed that turtles qualified as an „exhaustible natural resource‟,

42
43

Mehling et al, supra note 37, 466.
EC-Asbestos, supra note 32, para 172.
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providing a very broad interpretation under Article XX(g) of that term.44 In this case, the U.S.
imposed import restrictions on shrimp unless a turtle excluder device was used to catch them. In
particular, clean air was deemed to be an exhaustible natural resource in the US-Gasoline case.45
In this case, the U.S. Clean Air Act established baseline rules for gasoline sold on the U.S.
market in order to regulate emissions. The Appellate Body took an evolutionary approach to the
concept of exhaustible natural resources in this case, in light of contemporary concerns. 46 As a
result of these and subsequent disputes, it is likely that the atmosphere would qualify as an
exhaustible natural resource under Article XX(g), and a climate policy aimed at conservation of
a human, plant or animal species would also qualify under XX(g). 47
The second element is that a measure must relate to, or be reasonably related to, the
policy goal. 48 The term „relating to‟ has been deemed to be a lower standard than „necessary‟, but
must be primarily aimed at conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. Again for the
protectionist elements of a renewable energy policy, they must clearly relate to the overall
objective of the policy. Finally, the measure must be made in conjunction with domestic
restrictions either on production or consumption. In China-Rare Earth, the U.S. objected to
export restrictions imposed by China on the export of rare earth materials which are critical
components to batteries in renewable energy as well as technology and defence equipment. Here,
the Appellate Body did confirm that a member state must impose „real restrictions‟ on domestic
production or consumption that reinforce and complement the restrictions on international trade,

44

Determining that the term was broader than just the inclusion of „mineral‟ or „non-living‟ resources, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998), para
128.
45
US-Gasoline, supra note 31, at paragraph 6.21 and 6.37.
46
Mehling et al, supra note 37, 466.
47
Bodansky et al, supra note 21, at 333. See US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
WT/DS2/AB/R para 6.21 where a policy to reduce the depletion of clean air qualified for protection under XX(g).
48
US-Shrimp supra note 44, para 141.
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particular where there is large domestic consumption. 49 This is often referred to as the „evenhandedness‟ approach, and may require that domestic restrictions in greenhouse gas emissions be
implemented in conjunction with policies to enhance the production of renewables. This
corollary domestic activity could be activity which is articulated in country‟s nationally
determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, which is designed to be updated in fiveyearly

cycles,

demonstrating

progressive

domestic

reduction of greenhouse

gases.

Implementation of progressive nationally determined contributions domestically could
demonstrate that any renewable energy policy is designed to work in tandem to achieve domestic
emissions reductions, fulfilling the „even-handedness‟ approach.
D. Article XX – The Chapeau
As demonstrated above, the DSM has in the past, through progressive interpretive
approaches, provided significant domestic policy space for countries to implement traderestrictive measures provided they make a material contribution to legitimate domestic policies
under Articles XX(b) and (g). Most problematic for protectionist measures would be the chapeau
of Article XX. It requires that any measures applied by a party are not applied in a manner that
would constitute „a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination‟ or „a disguised restriction
on international trade.‟50 The chapeau does not prohibit discrimination, but only seeks to prevent
abusive discrimination. 51
Despite the strict language, judicial flexibility has also been applied under the chapeau in
the past. While the DSM determined that the U.S. fisheries import restrictions for shrimp not
caught using a turtle excluder device fell under Article XX(g) in the US-Shrimp dispute, the

49

See Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, ¶ 5.132, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R (May 20, 2015).
50
GATT Article XX. Each of these standards must be met and so all are applicable.
51
WOLD ET AL., supra note 22, at 275.
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measure failed the test under the chapeau. The U.S. then revised its approach to the import
restrictions by attempting to negotiate a multilateral solution with the affected parties. Even
though no multilateral solution was agreed by all parties, good faith negotiation efforts by the
U.S. were sufficient for the revised measure to survive the chapeau test.52 This added a largely
procedural component to the chapeau – merely entering into good faith negotiations was
sufficient. The emphasis was placed on fairness and due process, which was achieved through
the multilateral negotiations. Here, a less stringent approach to the language of the chapeau
demonstrates a preference by the Appellate Body for multilateralism, 53 and it is possible that the
multilateral arrangements, including nationally determined contributions under the Paris
Agreement, may be considered by the DSM as legitimate policy making on climate change.
Negotiation of the Paris Agreement took many years (arguably decades), and its provisions,
although largely soft law, should qualify as „serious, good faith efforts‟ to reach an
understanding on multilateral approaches to combat climate change.54 In addition, parties are
subject to stringent transparency requirements regarding the development and submission of
their nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement,55 which should provide the
degree of transparency emphasised by the Appellate Body when interpreting the chapeau.
Provided domestic energy policies fall in line with a country‟s nationally determined
contribution (which are to be updated in five-yearly cycles), multinational negotiations which

52

United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia (22 October 2001).
53
Bodansky et al, supra note 22, at 335.
54
US-Shrimp supra note 52; Mehling et al. supra note 37, 469 (noting however that in relation to the element of the
chapeau which requires that a measure must not discriminate against countries where the same conditions apply that
comparing different climate policies is vexing, and that given the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities under the Paris Agreement and special and differential treatment under
the WTO, special considerations should be applied to Least Developed Countries), although these latitudes are not
likely to be given to emerging economies the subject of this paper
55
See Article 13 on the transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.
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agreed and periodically reviewed these contributions should be sufficient to pass the test of the
chapeau.
Finally under the chapeau, any discriminatory element of a measure must be examined
against its ability to be reconciled with or rationally related to its policy objectives as
provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX. 56 While the climate
elements of any renewable energy policy would easily pass muster under the chapeau, the
economic portions of such a policy, such as local content requirements, would have to be
designed and applied in such a way that it necessarily leads to emissions reductions, 57 through
increased manufacture, installation and dissemination of renewable technology. While this may
be easier to prove through domestic dissemination, export activities may be more difficult to
justify under the chapeau. Any blatently protectionist measure targeted at export activities may
struggle to survive some of these tests as it becomes more difficult to tie directly to emissions
reductions, particularly domestic reductions. However, a policy that is specifically tied to
domestic emissions reductions, and therefore climate benefits, could benefit from progressive
treatment under Article XX, including its chapeau.
The nature of environmental disputes at the WTO and role of developing countries is
shifting. While the older disputes which led to progressive interpretation of Article XX
provisions were primarily natural resource and environmental disputes, energy disputes are now
replacing these older disputes. Wu and Salzman note that the „classic‟ environmental disputes of
the 1990s, where developing countries brought disputes against „protectionist‟ environmental
measures implemented by developed countries, have now given way to disputes brought
primarily by developed countries against new „green‟ industrial policy measures implemented by
56
57

EC-Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products WT/DS400 para 5.318.
Mehling et al. supra note 37, 470.
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developing countries.58 Developing countries were successful in all of their dispute efforts in
these older „classic‟ environmental disputes, but have experienced mixed and largely negative
outcomes in the newer energy disputes. Dubbed the „next generation‟ of trade and environmental
conflicts, Wu and Saltzman anticipate these new types of disputes, based on green industrial
policy, will dominate the trade and environment discourse for decades to come,59 and so
ultimately some synergy between the trade and climate change regime is needed.

II. ENERGY, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Meeting the long-term temperature goals in the Paris Agreement requires a large-scale,
global transition away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy. 60 Parties agreed to reach
peaking of global greenhouse gases as soon as possible, and achieve a balance between
emissions and removals in the second half of the century. 61 The architecture of the Paris
Agreement focuses on national action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and while renewable
energy is not specifically provided as a mandate under the Agreement, decarbonising the world‟s
energy system is “by far the primary method of stabilising global temperature increases.” 62 The
bottom up architecture of the Paris Agreement also means that its success will rest primarily on
domestic implementation on the basis of nationally determined contributions of both developed
and developing countries - developing countries are now important partners in the transition to

58

See Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Environmental Conflicts: The Rise of Green
Industrial Policy, 108 NW. UNIV L. REV. 401, 404 (2014) (listing the „classic‟ trio environmental disputes as
Tuna/Dolphin, Shrimp/Tuna and US-Gasoline, deeming cases such as EC-Biotech and Brazil-Tyres to be more
concerned with health than environmental issues).
59
Id.; See also ALAN YANOVICH, WTO RULES AND THE ENERGY SECTOR in GLOBAL TRADE LAW SERIES,
REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1, 1 (Yulia Selivanova ed., Wolter Kluwer 2011).
60
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Rethinking Energy 2017: Accelerating the Global Energy
Transformation (2017), at 23-24.
61
Article 4, The Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/L.9. This provision is commonly understood to mean net zero
emissions.
62
Dent, supra note 3,1-2.
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renewable energy63. Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement have a high
policy profile, and will likely include more government support for renewable energy, putting
them in increasing conflict with WTO rules where protectionist policies are involved, and at
increased risk of scrutiny by trade partners. 64 The Paris Agreement provides discretion to the
parties as to which specific support measures and policy instruments are most appropriate, 65
however the WTO does not provide such policy flexibility, as any measure must comply with
trade disciplines in the WTO covered agreements, enforceable through the DSM.
International trade not only allows firms to increase production, but can also aid in
diffusing clean energy technology, which is especially important for developing countries where
the “scope for achieving marginal gains in environmental welfare and energy efficiency are
generally greatest.”66 Dent notes that promoting international trade in clean energy can make
important contributions to climate change mitigation through business and market expansion
efforts.67 As a result, after the Paris Agreement, the overlap between trade and climate change
has taken on a “new urgency”. 68 A cascade of climate-friendly, trade-impacting measures could
lead to climate stabilization.69 Climate measures affect trade, but trade measures also affect

63

Provisions under the prior Kyoto Protocol imposed targeted emissions reductions on developed countries only.
Claussen supra note 4, at 4 and 30.
65
Gracia Maria Duran, Sheltering Government Support to „Green‟ Electricity: The EU and the WTO, INT‟L. AND
COMP. L. Q. 130, 134-5 (2018)(discussing climate obligations are subject to Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC which
mirrors the language of Article XX that a measure is not to constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade, and the Paris Agreement is silent on trade issues) But cf Daniel
Bodansky et al. supra note 21 (arguing that the UNFCCC regime therefore neither restricts nor condones the use of
trade measures and instead refers parties to existing trade law).
66
Id. at 1.
67
DENT, supra note 3, at 1.
68
Michael O. Moore, Carbon Safeguard? Managing the Friction Between Trade Rules and Climate Policy, 51 J.
WORLD TRADE 43, 45 (2017).
69
Juscelino F. Colares, Paths to Carbon Stabilization: How Foreign Carbon-Restricting Reforms Will Affect US
Industry, Climate Policy and the Prospects of a Binding Emission Reduction Treaty, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 281, 289
(2013).
64
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climate.70 However, the “inescapable nexus” between trade and climate change is not yet
reflected in either of the agendas or agreements of the WTO or the UNFCCC, and without new
WTO rules or a revised approach under the DSM, the legitimacy and efficiency of both the trade
and climate regimes may be undermined.71 This is particularly relevant for emerging economies
focused on export of subsidised renewable energy technology, whose policies are likely to
violate trade rules, including the SCM Agreement. The SCM Agreement focuses on trade flows
between the subsidy-providing WTO member and another WTO member. 72

A. Energy, Climate Change and Developing Countries
The international energy architecture is now faced with a number of difficult tasks,
including ensuring security of supply and demand, mitigation of climate change, promoting
energy efficiency and renewables, dampening price volatility, and reducing energy poverty.73
Emerging economies such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa play a vital role in
the contemporary energy landscape;74 they are increasingly driving global energy demand, but
are also carving out economic development space in the clean energy arena through green
industrial policies.
Developing countries have a large role to play in the climate, energy and trade nexus.
Growth in GHG emissions in the next few decades will come primarily from developing

70

JAMES BACCHUS, TRIGGERING THE TRADE TRANSITION: THE G20‟S ROLE IN RECONCILING RULES FOR TRADE AND
CLIMATE CHANGE, INT‟L. CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1 (2018).
71
Id. at vi.
72
Ilara Espa and Gracia Marin Duran, Renewable Energy Subsidies and WTO Law: Time to Rethink the Case for
Reform and Beyond Canada-Renewable Energy/Fit Program 21 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 621,
625 (2018).
73
SIJBREN DE JONG & JAN WONTERS, INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 18, 19 (Kim Talus, ed., Edward Elgar, 2014).
74
Id. at 25.
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countries, particularly from China and India. 75 As Wu and Saltzman note “as go India and China
with greenhouse gases, so goes the world.”76 The switch away from carbon to silicon in
renewable energy will also have global winners and losers. 77 Developing countries hold more
than half of the world‟s renewable energy capacity, 78 but are anticipated to bear the brunt of the
impacts of climate change.79 Governments in developing countries are already starting to face
litigation from climate vulnerable constituents. 80 These countries are being sent mixed messages:
to reduce emissions while being positioned as a respondent in WTO disputes, largely as a result
of disputes initiated by developed countries disputing pro-climate (but also pro-development)
policies. Developing countries have pressing poverty eradication and energy poverty needs and
are facing stark energy choices. The need to reduce global GHG emissions has become so dire
largely due to developed countries‟ historic responsibility; not making lifestyle sacrifices
necessary to move to lower per capita emissions. 81 Yet many of the world‟s carbon intensive (or
carbon major) corporations are in fact state-controlled corporations located in the developing
world.82
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WORLD BANK, supra note 60, at 1.
WU & SALTZMAN, supra note 58, at 449.
77
IRENA supra note 10.
78
See Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, Global Status Report, 1, 4 (2010)(discussing
governmental utilization of renewables); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Renewable Energy Sources
and Climate Change Mitigation Report: Summary for Policy Makers 9, (2013),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/renewable-energy-sources-and-climate-change-mitigation/.
79
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report 8, (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf; I Otto et al., Social Vulnerability
to Climate Change: A Review of Concepts and Evidence, 17 REGIONAL ENVTL CHANGE, 1658 (2017); David J.
Wrathall et al., Problematising Loss and Damage, 8 INT‟L J. GLOBAL WARMING, 282 (2015).
80
Joana Setzer and Lisa Benjamin, Climate litigation in the Global South: Constraints and Opportunities
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2019); Jacqueline Peel and Jolene Lin, Transnational Climate Litigation:
The Contribution of the Global South 113 AJIL (2019); Joana Setzer and Lisa Benjamin, Climate litigation in the
Global South: Filling Gaps forthcoming AJIL UNBOUND (2020); for an overview of climate litigation generally see
HARI OSOFSKY AND JACQUELINE PEEL, CLIMATE LITIGATION : REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY
(James Crawford & John S. Bell: 2015).
81
WU & SALTZMAN, supra note 58, at 444.
82
For example Sinopec in China and Saudi Aramco in Saudi Arabia, see generally Richard Heede, Tracing
anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement productions 1854-2010, CLIMATIC
CHANGE 229 (2013). For an overview of the importance of non-state actors, including corporations, to the new Paris
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While increased incorporation of renewables into domestic electricity grids is an
important part of the energy transition, this paper focuses on manufacture, implementation and
diffusion of green technology, which also faces many hurdles.83 Environmental externalities are
not well reflected in markets, there is inadequate information on products, and behavioural
barriers persist.84 In addition, continuous reinvestment in non-green infrastructure can lead to
path dependency on fossil fuels, and challenges regarding sources of finance. 85 Lock-in of fossil
fuel technology and infrastructure as well as market failures are difficult to surmount. 86
Developing countries face additional challenges promoting renewable energy, including
limited institutional, financial and human resources, and as a result government intervention is
often required.87 There has been limited progress in the last two decades on the transition to
green economic growth, in part due to the lack of global transition policy frameworks.88
Transition pathways are most effective if they include long-term visions, interim transition goals,
pathways for different actors and experimental policy learning. 89 This often involves green
industrial policy formation in emerging economies. Industrial policy formation experienced a
resurgence after the global financial crisis. 90 Emerging economies found themselves in relatively
stable macro-economic situations after the crisis, were more able to afford large programmatic
climate regime, see Thomas Hale, All Hands on Deck: The Paris Agreement and NonState Climate Action 16(3)
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2016); Thomas Hale, The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in
International Climate Processes, Research Paper (November 2018).
83
Electricity markets are predominantly local, crossing borders between countries where significant grid
infrastructure exists or could be built and so are subject to physical restraints, but renewable energy technology is a
more global market and traded across borders and so is more vulnerable to WTO trade disciplines, Espa and Duran,
supra note 72, 625-6.
84
Rene Kemp & Babette Never, Green Transition, Industrial Policy and Economic Development, 33 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POLICY 66, 66 (2017).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 67.
87
KEMP & NEVER, supra note 84, at 67.
88
Pablo Burkolter & Leisa Perch, Greening Growth in the South: Practice, Policies and New Frontiers, 21 S. AFR.
J. INT‟L AFF. 235, (2014).
89
KEMP & NEVER, supra note 84, at 67.
90
JE STIGLITZ, JUSTIN YIFU LIN & CELESTIN MONGA, INTRODUCTION: THE REJUVENATION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
in THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY REVOLUTION 2 (Sitglitz & Yifu Lin eds., 2013).
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approaches on green growth.91 These countries were also keen to adopt industrial policies which
could help sustain their growth and spur on new employment creation. 92 Governments remain
one of the main sources of incentives to protect the environment through domestic incentives and
environmental public policy making. 93
B. Green Industrial Policy Making
Green industrial policy-making by developing countries can be an area for real progress
in the transition to renewable energy, and litigation of energy disputes is now an important part
of the global climate regime. 94 Emerging economies are concerned about their own development
trajectories and needs, and therefore the transition to cleaner energy is often intertwined within
industrial policies for the protection of domestic industries, and in some cases, with forging an
economic pathway to global dominance in clean energy technologies. Developing countries need
access to clean energy technology in order to diversify their energy sources and reduce their
carbon emissions, and aim to do so without hindering their economic development.95 Of the 27
countries which make up 90% of the global green economy, 8 are from the Global South:
Argentina, Indonesia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. 96 It is a subset of
these same countries whose green industrial policies have been disputed at the WTO: Argentina,
Indonesia, India, and China. The actions of these countries are important as their domestic policy
decisions on energy can significantly affect global climate trajectories. 97 These countries have
adopted a number of strategies across domestic policy making, including local content
91

Burkoler & Perch, supra note 88, at 248.
Id.
93
BERNARD SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE & HEC MONTREAL, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, GREENING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 13 (2013).
94
WU & SALTZMAN, supra note 55, at 474.
95
WORLD BANK, infra note 60, at 73.
96
Burkolter& Perch, supra note 87, 237.
97 For example, China is currently facing energy risks due to the middle east crisis and US sanctions on Iran, see
Michael Lelyveld, China‟s Energy Risks Rise With Iran Sanctions Radio Free Asia (Oct 21, 2019).
92
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requirements which seek to foster local employment and competitive domestic industries in the
area of solar energy, mercantilist export control and export price increases in biofuels, and
subsidies and export restraints in wind power. The strategies used by developing countries have
to date been unsuccessful at the WTO.
Local content requirements in particular make public support for manufacturing of
renewable technology subject to a certain percentage of domestically produced components or
labour sources. There is mixed evidence on how successful local content requirements in
particular are in terms of their environmental aims. While they certainly reduce competition by
forcing reliance on local suppliers, 98 there is an argument that supporting local infant industries
can allow those industries to mature and become competitive, ultimately lowering prices globally
for renewable technology. 99 In addition, in large emerging economies, economies of scale may in
fact lead to lower prices for renewables both domestically and internationally. 100 These can in
turn increase competitive advantage, particularly in commodities, even by using imperfect
monopoly competition.101 Consistently applied subsidies can provide certainty to infant and
desirable industries such as renewable energy development. 102 The International Energy Agency
has projected that subsidies for investment and deployment of renewable energy will increase
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For example see L.A. Cosbey and L. Rubini, Does it FIT? An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Renewable
Energy Measures and of the Implications of Canada-Renewable Energy FIT Disputes (December, 2013); JC Kuntze
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types of subsidies, see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 74, 152.
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substantially in the next decade, reaching USD 400 billion by 2030.103 It is likely, therefore, that
all countries, including developed countries, will continue to rely on renewable energy subsidies
in the near future.
Many developing countries involved in WTO disputes have carved out „green‟ industrial
policy space which has a dual purpose: to protect and bolster their own domestic markets in both
natural resources and clean energy technology, while achieving environmental goals. Many
industrial policy measures are used to strengthen domestic production and technical capacities of
domestic producers, thereby achieving poverty reduction and development goals. 104 Emerging
economies have invested resources in developing green industrial policies to meet both
environmental and developmental goals. 105 These goals are often intricately intertwined, and
developing countries may be loath to remove the developmental aspects of their clean energy
policies. 106 There may not be one principal driver behind these policies, but economic, social and
environmental benefits may be equally influential.107 For example, it is estimated that between
2005-2020 thirty million new green jobs will be created in China. 108 India‟s solar mission plan is
explicitly concerned with energy security, energy access and energy poverty issues, as well as
domestic industry development, combining climate, social and economic development concerns.
Industrial policy mechanisms may have environmental aims, but also trigger
competitiveness concerns over rent-seeking with domestic industry promotion plans, as
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International Energy Agency, Energy and Climate Change – World Energy Outlook Special Report (2015),
https://webstore.iea.org/weo-2015-special-report-energy-and-climate-change 27.
104
DENT, supra note 3, at 3.
105
Dongsheng Zang, From Environment to Energy: China‟s Reconceptualization of Climate Change 27(3) 543
WISCONSIN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (2009) (explaining that China reconceptualised climate change from an
environmental to an energy issues between 1989 to 2009, primarily due to growing energy needs and energy
security concerns as well as growing international pressure to manage emissions), 564-65.
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Id.
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BURKOLTER & PERCH, supra note 88, at 252.
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Id., at 239.
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governments position their industries for the energy transition. 109 In some disputes, largely in
renewable energy and biofuels, developed countries are also employing protectionist methods.
Conflicting trade disciplines can hamper the ability of green growth strategies to contribute to
poverty alleviation and more equitable and inclusive development within these countries. 110

III. ENERGY AT THE WTO
Energy was not specifically regulated by the WTO as part of a separate, distinct energy
agreement due to historical reasons. At the time of the formation of the GATT, liberalisation of
the energy market was not a political priority. 111 At that time, the energy market was heavily
cartelised, dominated largely by fossil fuel companies and state-run monopolies.112 In addition,
the WTO has a “market access bias” 113 and so the rules place emphasis on reducing import
tariffs. However, as Marhold notes, problems in global energy trade now revolve primarily
around export taxes or restrictions, not import tariffs. 114 In the 1970s the oil crisis did put export
restrictions on the WTO negotiating table, but no agreement could be reached on the issue. 115 In
particular, resource-endowed countries were wary of agreeing binding rules on trade in natural
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Bradly J. Condon, Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the Transition to a Low-Carbon World, 51 J.
WORLD TRADE 675, 677 (2017).
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BURKOLTER & PERCH, supra note 88, at 252. There has also been progressive economic and regulatory
interdependence between countries, leading to diffusion of policy formation from the core to the periphery, see
Emily Jones and Alexandra Zeitz, Regulatory Convergence in the Financial Periphery: How Interdependence
Shapes Regulators‟ Decision 63 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 908 (2019). Support for renewable energy
policy formation could serve as a regulatory diffusion device as well, leading to increased South-South collaboration
on renewable energy development and diffusion.
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ECKHOUSE ET. AL., supra note 11, at 1.
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Anna Marhold, The WTO and Energy: Fuel for Debate, 9 EUR. SOC‟Y INT‟L. L. REFLECTIONS, 4 (Sept. 30 2013).
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See id. (discussing Article XI of the GATT covers both import and export restrictions it covers only quantitative
export limits but not export duties, taxes or charges); See also Yanovich, supra note 38, 1. Although the Trump
Administration has reinvigorated the use of tariffs in international trade.
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Yulia Selivanova, THE WTO AGREEMENTS AND ENERGY in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
LAW 275, 276 (Kim Talus, ed., Edward Elgar, 2014).
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resources as well as environmental provisions, due to a fear of green protectionism by developed
countries. 116
The present day energy sector is now more complex and stratified and encompasses fossil
and non-fossil fuels, including oil, gas, wood, electricity, atomic energy, wind, solar, tidal, wave
energy and biofuels. 117 The changing nature of energy sources means WTO covered agreements
are directly applicable to its governance. Despite the diversification of energy sources, energy is
still different from other industries due to its physical characteristics, leading to natural
monopolies where energy resources are located (often in developing countries). 118 The bulk of
international regulation of energy remains at the domestic level, with the role of international law
in addressing energy remaining “unclear and unsettled”, 119 despite the fact that energy trade has
transcended national borders.120
Energy straddles both goods and services at the WTO as its physical properties are often
not severable from the production process and channels of distribution – electricity is dependent
upon networks and grids for distribution but renewable energy technology is traded more freely
across borders.121 As such, treatment of energy within the WTO covered agreements is
fragmented, leading some commentators to argue it would be better dealt with under a WTO
Framework Agreement on Energy. 122 Unfortunately, there is little hope for progressive
development of the legislative agenda at the WTO at the moment, and in the absence of a
cohesive legislative approach to energy, the DSM has been the main mechanism which has
116

Id. at 277; Carolyn Deere Birkbeck, 20 Years of Debate on Environment, Trade and Sustainable Development at
the WTO: A Literature Review (1995-2015), Global Econ. Governance Program Working Paper No. 114, U. OF
OXFORD, 19-20 (2016).
117
Cottier et al. supra note 27.
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Id. at 1.
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Id. at 3.
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KIM TALUS, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ENERGY LAW in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
LAW 3, 5 (Kim Talus, ed., Edward Elgar, 2014).
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Cottier et al., supra note 27, at 9.
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managed the relationship of energy under the WTO. Under the DSM, Meyer notes that WTO
parties have engaged in selective enforcement by only bringing suits against renewable energy
domestic policies, and not against fossil fuel subsidies. 123 This selective enforcement imposes
additional costs on renewable energy‟s ability to compete in the market place, may slow
investment in necessary innovation, and subsidizes products with large social costs such as fossil
fuels. 124
A. The DSM and Emerging Energy Disputes
Since 2010, there have been a number of energy-related disputes adjudicated at the DSM.
Trade flows as well as trade disputes in clean energy are dominated by a select group of
countries, often correlated with the largest global emitters, traders and markets for clean energy
investments.125 The role and involvement of developing countries in these disputes is increasing,
and as a result, new types of arguments, such as the principle of sustainable development, are
being employed by these countries in order to attempt to bolster and reorient existing GATT
defences in a more climate but especially development-friendly direction. Reliance on the DSM
alone to adjudicate conflicts between trade and climate is less than ideal. As Condon notes, “The
shoddy structure of the SCM Agreement, the poor judgment of WTO tribunals, the consensus
blocking squabbling of WTO negotiations, and the mixed signals of energy markets have
combined to create a perfect storm for the transition to clean energy.” 126 The parties in these
disputes have had to rely on agreements and provisions within the WTO covered agreements
123

Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade and Selective Enforcement 118 491, 494 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
(2018).
124
Id., 498.
125
Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz & Mahesh Sugathan, Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-Up of Clean Energy
Technologies: Options for the Global Trade System- Synthesis of Policy Options, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 933, 937
(2017).
126
Bradly J. Condon, Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the Transition to a Low-Carbon World, 51 J.
WORLD TRADE 675, 677-678 (2017); although Espa and Duran consider that there is very little conflict between the
WTO and the SCM Agreement in particular and climate change, supra note *, 622.
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which arguably do not cater specifically for energy, climate change or sustainable development
concerns. Ultimately both legislative amendments and jurisprudential adjustments will be
necessary to have a more cohesive approach to trade, energy and climate change at the WTO.
Despite there being no energy agreement at the WTO, energy jurisprudence has had to be
developed at the WTO by necessity, due to the sheer number disputes being invoked between
developed and developing countries, as well as the changing nature of energy sources. 127 The
first biofuels case was decided in 2012, and the most recent substantive decision on an energy
dispute was published in June 2019. Some trends are identified. The original set of energy
disputes saw developed countries submitting complaints against the domestic policies of other
developed countries. Soon after that, the domestic policies of developing countries became a
target, largely for developed countries. More recently, India has disputed renewable policies in 8
different US states. In addition, developing countries are now challenging other developing
countries in relation to their domestic policies, with Argentina requesting consultations with Peru
over domestic biofuels policies. As a result, domestic policies of both developed and emerging
economies are now vulnerable to challenges.
Article XX defences in all cases in which they were invoked by these countries has failed
to justify green industrial policies, largely due to those policies‟ protectionist elements. In
addition, even where developing countries have found success in the biofuels disputes in law,
their “successes” are being frustrated by developed countries through use of protectionist
measures. These developments mean it is more and more likely that developing countries will
employ strategic or convenient compliance strategies in order to further their developmental
objectives unless an approach can be adopted which bridges the divide between the green
industrial policy aims of these countries and WTO jurisprudence.
127

Droege et al. supra note 4, at 3.
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In the short term, a strategic compliance approach may not be entirely negative if it
provides policy space for countries to implement urgent and progressive climate action by
fostering the manufacture and diffusion of renewable energy technology. However, in the longer
term, a more synergistic relationship between the WTO and the Paris Agreement should be
found. In particular for developing countries which seek to export renewable energy, multilateral
disputes at the DSM can result in suspensions of concessions through the trade remedy function
which can negatively affect other areas of their economy. Unilateral remedies can also be
harmful where an importing country identifies a material injury as a result of another country‟s
domestic measures in accordance with the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
Agreement.128 In fact, the bulk of trade remedies against renewable energy policies are occurring
at the unilateral level. 129 Unilateral measures can also increase the cost of renewables
internationally, and can be particularly problematic for emerging economies that export
renewable technology. 130 Despite these negative effects, unilateral actions do not result in direct
trade remedies against a subsidising country, and still allow for increased domestic production
and diffusion, as well as export to other countries which have not implemented unilateral
measures.
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Wu and Saltzman highlight the concern regarding unilateral measures by countries, supra note 55. Espa and
Duran criticize the ability of a unilateral determination of material injury and the ability of governments to balance
negative trade-distortive policies against positive climate mitigation effects particularly when their own domestic
industries may be suffering as a result, although they point to the EU Council dispute as to whether countervailing
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For example, decreased subsidy support in China for renewables and the transition to market based approaches
has been linked to the high cost of public subsidies but also economic uncertainty due to trade conflicts with the
United States, see Michael Standaert, Why China‟s Renewable Energy Transition is Losing Momentum Yale
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Successful climate change mitigation strategies should arguably support developing
countries‟ economic and social development needs,131 and so trade policy should work in tandem
with climate and development aims. Unfortunately the jurisprudence assessed to date does not
lead to these outcomes for the developing countries involved. Progressive interpretive
approaches adopted by the DSM and highlighted in section I above, could be extended to
domestic renewable energy policies which advance nationally determined contributions under
the Paris Agreement and also protect public health and natural resources under both Articles
XX(b) and (g).
IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY DISPUTES AT THE WTO
Energy sources are diverse, and are dealt with in different WTO covered agreements
depending on their typology. 132 As a result, different and competing forms of energy are subject
to strongly divergent international trade rules. 133 The first category of renewable energy disputes
largely involves the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM Agreement) as
well as Article III of the GATT, and the TRIMS Agreement. 134 A subsidy exists under the SCM
Agreement if there is a financial contribution by a government or public body, which confers a
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WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
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Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada-Measures Relating to
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WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted June 5, 2014); Panel Report, US-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
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benefit which is specific to certain enterprises. 135 Subsidies can be applied to facilitate renewable
energy investment and production, but can also provide subsidies for fossil fuel investments and
so have important implications for action under the Paris Agreement. 136 These disputes involve
not only subsidies but local content requirements which can constitute discriminatory treatment,
and may trigger a subsidy dispute. The SCM does not distinguish between subsidies for
renewable energy and non-renewables.
The second category of biofuels cases involves the Agreement on Agriculture as well as
Article VI of the GATT, as biodiesel and ethanol are included in the HS classification system of
agricultural crops.137 The Agreement on Agriculture classifies biofuels based on whether the
base crop is an industrial or agricultural product.
A. Renewable Energy Disputes
The first renewable energy dispute in 2012 involved developed countries on both sides as
both complainants and respondents. The Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT dispute138 involved
protectionist policies being both employed and contested by developed countries. This case also
established important approaches and interpretations by the Panel and Appellate Body to the
SCM Agreement, which affected later cases in this vein. However, renewable energy disputes
quickly evolved to include developing countries as well. In 2014, the US-Countervailing Duty

135

Article 1.2 and 2.1(a) and 2.2 of the SCM Agreement.
Droege et al. supra note 3, at 36. For an analysis of fossil fuel subsidies generally, see JAKOB SKOVGAARD AND
HARRO VAN ASSELT THE POLITICS OF FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES AND THEIR REFORM (CUP:2018). Meyer notes that no
fossil fuel subsidies have ever been the subject of a dispute at the WTO, supra note 122.
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Panel Report, EU-Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS443/R (adopted Oct.
26, 2016); Appellate Body Report, EU-Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc.
WT/DS443/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016); Panel Report, EU-Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia,
WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (adopted Feb. 28, 2018).
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Measures on Certain Products from China 139 was decided by the Appellate Body with recourse
to an Article 21.5 Panel decision published in March 2018, 140 and in 2016 the India-Certain
Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules was decided by the Appellate Body. 141 In
these two disputes, a developing country has been in both the position of complainant as well as
respondent respectively.
Figure 1 – Renewable Energy Disputes at the WTO142

1.

2.

3.

Case
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CanadaJapan and Canada
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not

Panel Report, US-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/R
(adopted Aug. 15, 2019), Appellate Body Report, US-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Aug. 15, 2019); Article 21.5 Panel Report, US-Countervailing Duty
Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/RW (adopted Aug. 15, 2019).
140
Although on May 4, 2018 China submitted a request to appeal this decision.
141
Panel Report, India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R;
Appellate Body Report, India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc.
WT/DS456/AB/R.
142
A number of disputes have never proceeded beyond the request for consultations stage and therefore have not
been covered in detail, such as China-Wind where the US challenged grants given by the Chinese government for
use of domestic parts by Chinese wind power manufacturers in 2011 and China terminated the programme, and EURenewable Energy dispute brought by China against domestic content attached to FIT programmes in Europe in
2012. The figures of the disputes summarize only the main aspects and articles involved in the dispute and broad
outcomes.
143
This appellate body dispute involved solar panels only. Trade remedy disputes to implement the AB outcome
were not as successful for China, see US-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
ChinaWT/DS437/RW Recourse to Article 21.5 21 March 2018 which had mixed results for China, and on 4 May
2018 China requested an appeal of this decision (WT/DS437/25).
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4.
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GATT
III:4

None

India successful
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III:4.145

1. Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT
The first dispute involved a feed-in-tariff by the Government of Ontario which entered
into contractual agreements with producers of solar and wind energy. The feed-in-tariff was
constituted by a fixed price per unit of production in order to encourage participation of new
generation facilities to replace the phasing out of coal-fired plants, as well as to stimulate local
investment in the production of renewable energy equipment. 146 Local investment was stimulated
through the requirement, in addition to fixed feed-in-tariffs, of a minimum local or domestic
content requirement in the development and construction of solar PV panels and wind power
facilities. The case therefore involved government support to both electricity generators (mainly
local suppliers) as well as to green technology products (which can be more easily traded

144

This dispute is also going to a trade remedy phase, see India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar
Modules WT/DS456/R Request for panel under Article 21.5, 29 January 2018.
145

The United States has requested an appeal of this dispute, but given the existing stasis at the Appellate Body it is
unclear when an appeal will be heard.
146
Aaron Cosbey, Petros C. Mavroides & Edwin B. Parker, A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial
Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO, 17 J. INT‟L ECON. L.
11, 13 (2014); see Henok Birhame Ashmelash, Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why only Renewable
Energy Subsidies are Challenges, 18 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 261, 283 (2015)(noting that Japan may have initiated the
dispute against Canada in response to Canada signing an agreement with the Korean company Samsung to
manufacture solar panels, a competitor to the Japanese firms Mitsubishi and Sharp).
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internationally). 147 The local content requirement was deemed to be a violation of Article III of
the GATT. The Panel was keen to note the importance of the electricity sector as the “lifeblood
of modern society”, and that it was not disputing the public goal of enhancing renewable energy
generation, but was focusing instead on the trade distortive elements of the programme. 148
However, while the Panel decided that there was not sufficient evidence to establish
whether a benefit had been provided under the SCM Agreement,149 the Appellate Body took a
different approach, and defined the relevant product market for the SCM Agreement as separate
for conventional energy versus renewable energy. This was justified by the AB on the basis that
the renewable energy market, emphasising supply-side factors such as operating costs, upfront
costs, and intermittency, had been constructed entirely through government regulation instead of
market forces.150 The AB was clear in its support for the public policy goals involved, stating:
Governments intervene by reducing reliance on fossil fuel energy
resources and promoting the generation of electricity from
renewable energy resources to ensure sustainability of electricity
markets in the long term. Fossil energy resources are exhaustible,
and thus fossil energy needs to be replaced progressively if
electricity supply is to be guaranteed in the long term. 151
In subsequent energy cases, no such comments regarding public policy interventions in
the transition away from fossil fuels, or in fact climate change, are mentioned by the Panel or the
AB again. 152 The AB‟s approach has been heavily criticized as “legal acrobatics” to avoid
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DURAN, supra note 20, at 136; see Patrice Bougette & Christophe Charlier, Renewable Energy, Subsidies, and
the WTO: Where Has the „Green‟ Gone?, 51 ENERGY ECON. 407, 407 (2015) (noting that subsidies to renewable
energy producers also has “pass through” effects which benefit power generational equipment producers).
148
Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada-Measures Relating to
the Feed in Tariff Program, ¶ 7.7-7.10, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/R (adopted June 5, 2014).
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Id. at ¶ 7.242.
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Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector/Canada-Measures
Relating to the Feed in Tariff Program, ¶5.176-5.185, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted June 5, 2014).
151
See id. at ¶5.186.
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Although see Brazil-Taxation supra note 33.
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finding a scheme aimed at a public good an inconsistent subsidy, and for providing the wrong
incentive to states to develop “unlimited industrial policy”. 153
As a result of this dispute, critics have called for the SCM Agreement to be renegotiated
in order to provide wider policy space for countries to implement public goods of mitigation of
climate change, and also to expressly apply environmental defences under Article XX directly to
the SCM Agreement.154 These suggested amendments involve legislative fixes, and should be
carried out in conjunction with the jurisprudential approaches suggested here. More progressive
interpretations of Article XX could still allow for disputes under the SCM Agreement against
domestic subsidies, and so both legislative and jurisprudential adjustments are needed.
After the decision, the Canadian Government did reduce, but did not eliminate, the local
content requirement.155 Charnovitz and Fisher note this reluctance to eliminate local content
requirements reflects a broad consensus among countries that renewable energy support is a
legitimate form of industrial policy-making. 156 While this policy has climate change mitigation
and energy security aims, it also has job creation and domestic technological progress objectives
as well. 157 The following two sets of disputes do involve developing countries, but have attracted
much less scholarly attention than the Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT dispute.
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COSBEY ET AL., supra note 144, at 12; see also Rajib Pal, Has the AB‟s Decision in Canada-Renewable
Energy/Canada-FIT Opened the Door for Production Subsidies?, 17 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 125 (2014); Rolf H. Weber
& Rika Koch, International Trade Law Challenges by Subsidies for Renewable Energy, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 757,
779 (2015); Luca Rubini, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. Lessons on Methodology in Legal Analysis from the
Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 895-938 (2014); although Espa and
Duran argue that the case did not have a chilling effect on the use of FIT programs globally, supra note 68, 635.
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COSBEY, supra note 145, at 28-34.
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CHARNOVITZ & FISHER, supra note __, at 181; and see Espa and Duran supra note 72, 147 that the case had no
chilling effect on the use of FIT programs globally and FIT programs are unlikely to be disputed by WTO members
in the future.
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Id. at 186.
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Kati Kulovesi, International Trade Disputes on Renewable Energy: Testing Ground for the Mutual
Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate Change Law, 23 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT‟L ENVTL L. 342, 343 (2014).
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2. US-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China
In 2007, US-based firms, including the US Wind Tower Trade Coalition, as well as the
Steelworkers Association, petitioned the United States Trade Representative to initiate an antidumping and countervailing duty investigation against imports from China. 158 From 1996-2005
foreign companies dominated the Chinese domestic wind turbine market, holding 75% of the
market.159 However, by 2009 China had become the world‟s top installer of wind, exceeding the
US.160 As a result, China began exporting wind turbines to the US, which the US saw as draining
investment in this technology from the US to China. 161 The US Department of Commerce
applied 17 countervailing duty investigations during 2007-2012 which included solar panels,
wind towers, steel cylinders and steel sinks, on the basis that 12 Chinese State Owned
Enterprises were public bodies under the SCM Agreement, and had applied subsidies
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. On most issues (except wind towers and solar panels) the
US was held to have acted inconsistently with the SCM Agreement in determining that
ownership in and of itself was sufficient to deem a state owned enterprise a public body under
Article 1.1(a)(i) of the SCM Agreement. At the AB level, only solar panels were at issue. The
AB found here that the US explanation for rejecting in-country prices in its benchmark analysis
of solar panels was inconsistent with its obligations under Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM
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Henok Birhame Ashmelash, Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy
Subsidies are Challenged, 18 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 261, 282 (2015).
159
Seung-Youn Oh, How China Outsmarts WTO Rulings in the Wind Industry, 55 ASIAN SURVEY 1116, 1120
(2015).
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Kenina Lee, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and a Sustainable Future? Evaluating the Consistency of
Canadian and Chinese Renewable Energy Policies with WTO Trade Law, 57 GEO. INT‟L ENVTL L. REV. 24, 83
(2011). See also Oh, supra note 157, at 1117-1119 (noting that China achieved this global dominance through a
combination of integrated industrial policies in both demand and supply side markets to achieve wind dominance,
and its motivations for doing so were a mix of wanting to diversify energy resources, mitigation of environmental
issues and to encourage industrial upgrades).
161
Id. at 83 (discussing The US also challenges grants given by the Chinese government for use of domestic parts
by Chinese wind power manufacturers in 2011, and brought a request for consultations in the China-Wind dispute,
but instead of proceeding to a dispute, China terminated the program).
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Agreement.162 While successful at the AB level, China has not yet been able to secure
compliance by the US with the AB‟s ruling. Under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, the arbitrator
determined that 15 months was adequate for the US to implement the ruling, but subsequently in
November 2016 China sought recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings, claiming the US had not yet
implemented the ruling. 163
3. India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules
In 2010 India launched its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, with the objective of
establishing India as a global leader in solar energy, as well as to create conditions for the
diffusion of solar energy across the country. 164 The programme aimed to generate 100,000 MW
of grid-connected solar power by 2022, and to achieve rapid and large-scale capital investment in
solar energy, encourage technical innovation and phased indigenization.165 The Twelveth Five
Year Plan of 2011 recognizes that climate change mitigation policies would have differential
impacts on national development objectives such as job creation, competitiveness, and industrial
growth, as well as improving access to energy. 166 Domestic climate policy in India (as
elsewhere) is shaped by national and sub-national development interests.167 The National Solar
Mission established in 2010 clearly states national ambitions as both promoting ecological and
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See Appellate Body Report, US-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, ¶ 4.79, WTO
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sustainable growth while addressing the nation‟s energy security challenge. 168 These dual aims
are to be achieved through the creation of conditions to enable rapid scale-up of capacity and
technical innovation to drive down the costs of solar energy. 169 The policy took a phased
approach, with phase 2 between 2013-2017 focused on aggressively ramping up capacity to
create conditions for scaled up and competitive solar energy penetration across the country.170
The policy specifically targeted electrification programmes in remote villages as well as
supporting small and medium sized enterprises in manufacturing parts. 171 In addition, India‟s
enormous growth in the past few decades is straining existing energy resources, with 80% of the
oil used derived from imports.172 Therefore energy security is also a major aim of the domestic
programme. Curiously improvement in air pollution and health did not form part of the strategic
plan.
In order to achieve the aims of the program, the Government would enter into long-term
power purchase agreements with solar power developers, providing a guaranteed rate for 25
years from the Government. During Phase I of the programme, it was mandatory for all
generators to use crystalline silicon solar modules manufactured in India, constituting a local
content requirement.173 The US brought a dispute against India for violation of Article III:4 of
the GATT for the local content requirement and Article 2.1 of TRIMS (the US did not invoke the
SCM Agreement, perhaps due to the Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT decision). Following the
Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT decision, the Panel found the local content requirement violated
both Article III:4 of the GATT as well as Article 2.1 of TRIMS.
168
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2011, 7, https://mnre.gov.in/sites/default/files/uploads/strategic_plan_mnre_2011_17.pdf.
173
Id.

43

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568192

Unlike Canada, however, India ran several defences under Article III:8(a) for government
policies, but also under Articles XX(j) and (d). Curiously, India did not attempt to apply the
defences of Articles XX(b) for health grounds on the basis of reduced air pollution in the
transition to renewable energy, or XX(g) for the protection of the atmosphere as an exhaustible
natural resource due to climate change,174 and therefore an opportunity was missed for renewable
energy deployment in the context of climate change to be examined by the Panel and AB.
Instead, India couched defences around energy security and energy access needs and regulatory
climate requirements; that under XX(j) domestically manufactured solar cells and modules could
help to meet increasing domestic energy demand and supplement shortage of supplies of foreign
solar cells, and that under XX(d) the solar programme was required for India to comply with a
number of both international treaties (including the UNFCCC) and domestic instruments to
mitigate climate change and transition to renewable energy. 175 India may have focused on Article
XX(j) and not on XX(b) due to the emphasis in its national policy on energy security, and its
lack of emphasis in domestic policy on the impacts of climate change on health.
India was not successful on either counts. In relation to XX(j), both the Panel and AB
held that there was no objective assessment of an existing deficiency of renewable energy in
India, and while there was some risk of disruption of supply in affordable foreign solar cells,
India had not identified actual disruptions in supply, and therefore could not employ the XX(j)
defence. 176 In relation to Article XX(d), India cited the preambular reference to sustainable
development in the WTO Agreement, the UNFCCC, the Rio Declaration and UNGA Resolution
2012 adopting the Rio +20 Declaration. The Panel held that these instruments did not have direct
174

Bodansky et al. supra note 21 (arguing that based on the US-Gasoline and the Shrimp/Turtle disputes, the global
climate would constitute an exhaustible natural resource and therefore bring climate change mitigation policies
within the ambit of Article XX(g)).
175
See paragraphs 7.189-190 and 7.191.
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effect in India and therefore did not fall under the remit of Article XX(d), and India‟s laws on
renewable energy were more akin to policy documents than regulations. 177
On appeal, the AB did note, in relation to Article XX(j), that developing countries may be
more vulnerable to disruptions in supply, and that an analysis of whether a product is in short
supply must be done on a case by case basis, taking into account holistic factors. 178 However,
while the AB could agree that an increase in domestic capacity may lead to an increase in total
quantity of available supply of renewable energy, it did not agree that a decrease in domestic
capacity would necessarily produce a foreign shortfall. 179 In relation to Article XX(d), the AB
held that the instruments pointed out by India did not contain the requisite degree of normativity,
specificity and enforceability. 180 The domestic national plans and policies on energy were too
hortatory, aspirational, declaratory and descriptive to qualify for protection under Article
XX(d).181
4. United States – Certain Measures Relating to Renewable Energy
In September 2018, India requested consultations with the United States regarding
domestic content and labour requirements as well as other incentives provided by California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana and Texas. India claimed that several
regulations in these states treated imported like products less favourably than domestic products
and therefore violated Article III:4 of GATT as well as several articles of the TRIMs and SCM
Agreement. These various regulations offered incentives for renewable energy equipment or
electricity provided from equipment or components made in the relevant state or employing a
177
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certain percentage of residents of that state. For example, the California Self-Generation
Incentive Program provided incentives for installation of new qualifying technologies which
would meet the electric energy needs of a new facility. An added incentive payment of 20%
would be provided to any retail electric or gas distribution customer for installation of eligible
distributed resources from a California supplier or manufacturer.182 The Delaware Renewable
Energy Portfolio Standards Act required that electricity suppliers and municipal electric
companies sell a certain percentage of their electricity using eligible energy resources including
solar energy. This was tracked using renewable and solar energy credits tradeable in an
electronic market system. An additional 10% credit was provided to retail electricity suppliers
for meeting the renewable energy portfolio standards for solar or wind energy from installations
sited in Delaware, provided a minimum of 50% of the renewable equipment used was
manufactured in Delaware or from a facility constructed or staffed with a minimum of 75% of
in-state workforce. The disputed policies of Texas and Montana concerned biodiesel and ethanol
which enjoyed tax incentives if the fuel or feedstock for those fuels were produced in the state
concerned.
The Panel found that all of these measures violated Article III:4 by impacting the
conditions of competition between domestic and imported products, even though some of these
incentives payments had never been used. It did not matter to the Panel that no trade effects or
proof that the measures had affected sourcing decisions of private firms had been provided. 183
The United States did not attempt to rely on any Article XX defences in this dispute, and has

182
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See California Public Utilities code Section 379.6.
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appealed the decision. At the moment, given the backlog of cases pending appeal, the dispute is
unlikely to be resolved for some time. 184
5. Developing Country Strategies of Strategic or Convenient Compliance in Renewable Energy
Disputes and Missing Article XX(b) and (g) Defences
In these disputes, China was successful in defeating unilaterally imposed protectionist
policies adopted by the U.S. in relation to solar cells and wind turbines in principle, but
substantive trade remedies to remove the trade-inconsistent behaviour have yet to be realised.
Under WTO law, the case provided Chinese state-owned enterprises the flexibility to continue to
provide subsidies to the industry provided the enterprises are structured so that they do not fall
under the definition of a “public body” under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. However,
China has not been successful in fact (as opposed to success in law), as the US has not brought
its measures into conformance. In a corollary action, the U.S. did bring a dispute against China
for subsidies in the wind industry (China-Wind), and China decided to remove the tradedistorting practice instead of pursuing the dispute to a Panel decision. In relation to this
consultation on the China-Wind issue, Oh argues that even when China withdrew the offending
subsidies pursuant to the request for consultations from the U.S., China‟s pattern of strategic or
“convenient compliance” allowed it enough time to achieve economic dominance in the wind
industry, fulfilling its development goals through non-WTO compliant behaviour, while
maintaining its reputation as a responsible member of the international community by complying
when necessary. 185

184

As the U.S. has been blocking appointments of AB judges for several years, the number of available judges has
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185
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India may be pursuing a similar strategy. While its national solar mission was found to be
in violation of WTO agreements in 2016, the US raised a request in January 2018 for an Article
21.5 decision, claiming that two years after the AB decision, India had not brought its
programme into compliance with WTO Agreements. India appears to be pursuing the same
approach as the U.S. has in the US-Countervailing Duty case, and as China did in China-Wind –
by delaying compliance until developmental and environmental goals have been largely
achieved. Attempts by India to rely on international climate treaties and energy access and
energy poverty issues as an environmental or developmental defence under Articles XX(d) and
(j) failed under WTO law. India is strategically avoiding compliance in order to gain the
maximum environmental and developmental benefits of its national solar programme.
There is also a notable absence of the mention of climate mitigation in these disputes,
apart from India‟s emphasis on the UNFCCC and Rio+20. 186 The atmosphere would most likely
form part of natural resources protected under Article XX(g), 187 even if renewable energy is
being exported outside of national borders. In addition, India‟s National Solar Mission policy
does not focus on the health implications of climate change, and the role that renewable energy
can play in the reduction of pollution but also the access to energy. Energy poverty can lead to
disease, gender inequality and even death. As a result, diffusing renewable energy in rural areas
could improve life expectancy, bringing the policy within the ambit of both Articles XX(b) and
(g).
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B. Biofuels Disputes
The second category of cases involves the export of biofuels. Biofuels are a potential
alternative to fossil fuels, particularly in the transportation sector. 188 They constitute both
biodiesel for use primarily in diesel engines and made from ethanol or alcohol from fermented
plant starches, and bioethanol for use in petrol engines and made from vegetable oil or animal
fats.189 The environmental sustainability of biofuels has been debated, particularly first
generation biofuels, as their production can lead to direct and indirect land-use change, remove
arable land for food production, and provide low wages and insecure employment.190
Developing countries have been both active and successful in law in biofuels disputes.
Argentina is a major exporter of biofuels based on raw materials of soyabeans, and Indonesia
based on palm oil. Due to labour costs, geography and climate, developing countries have natural
cost advantages in the production of biofuels. 191 Major exporters of biofuels include Brazil,
Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Saudi Arabia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, India, Korea and
Nigeria.192 Developed countries therefore need a high rate of subsidization in order to protect
their industries from lower cost imports from tropical regions. 193 Due to the nature of biofuels as
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(2008).
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crops, they fall under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), but fall under two different
categories in the HS classification system (bioethanol under HS Chapter 22 and biodiesel under
HS Chapter 38) based on their chemical composition.194 Biodiesel is also classed as an industrial
good, subject to the SCM Agreement.195
Developing countries have employed differential export tariffs in order to protect their
domestic biofuel industries. They have taxed the export of raw materials used in the development
of biofuels at a higher rate than the export of processed biofuels. 196 This allows the value of the
raw materials to be reduced on the domestic market, making them cheaper for purchase by
domestic producers, and therefore making domestically processed biofuels more competitive on
the international markets,197 allowing domestic producers to scale the value chain and bolster
domestic biofuel industries. In response to these strategies, the EU added anti-dumping duties
under the Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA) on to imports of biofuels from developing countries,
leading to two sets of disputes brought by Argentina and Indonesia, both acting as complainants.
Figure 2 – Biofuels Disputes at the WTO198
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1. EU-Anti Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina
Argentina brought a dispute against the EU regarding anti-dumping duties imposed on
biodiesel from Argentina. The EU argued that they added the duties based on the international
reference price for what domestic Argentinian biofuels producers should have paid for domestic
raw material inputs by adding to the price of soybeans the direct export taxes imposed by
Argentina in order to construct the normal value for dumping calculations. 199 Argentina argued
that this approach violated Article 2.2.1.1 and 2.5 of the ADA Agreement which required the EU
to determine the normal value based on the domestic producer‟s records in the country of origin,
and whether they reasonably reflect the costs of production actually incurred by the producers. 200
The Panel and AB agreed with Argentina, deciding that as a general principle the actual data of
producers in the country of origin was to be preferred in constructing the normal value. In

199
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200
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addition, the EU had failed to calculate costs correctly on the basis of the records kept by
domestic producers.201
2. EU-Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia
The subsequent case, decided in 2018, involved a dispute brought by Indonesia against
similar practices by the EU on biodiesel implemented in 2013 by the EU as a result of
complaints by the European Biodiesel Board. Similar to Argentina, Indonesia claimed the EU
had not calculated the costs of production of biodiesel based on records of domestic producers in
constructing the normal value for Indonesian producers, claiming the set of circumstances facing
Indonesia was “essentially identical” to those successfully raised by Argentina. 202 The EU
claimed that differential export tariffs depressed the price of soybeans and soybean oil from
Argentina, as well as crude palm oil (CPO) from Indonesia, distorting the cost of biodiesel
producers.203 Indonesia added an export tax of 40% on the raw material for CPO, palm fruit. 204
The EU disregarded the actual costs of raw materials as recorded by producers in Indonesia, and
instead used the reference price for CPO as published by Indonesian authorities which averaged
published international prices from three sources (costs, insurance and freight from Rotterdam,
Malaysia and Indonesia).205 The Panel held this approach violated Article 2.2.1.1 of the ADA
which required that costs normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by exporters or
producers under investigation, provided their records are in accordance with GAAP. It should be
noted that the palm oil industry in Indonesia in particular has been highly criticized for its

201
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contributions to deforestation, and therefore although a renewable energy, its climate benefits are
highly questionable.206
3. Developing Country “Success” in Biofuels Disputes
Both Argentina and Indonesia were successful in their anti-dumping disputes against the
EU under WTO law. This is in part due to the fact that export duties are not disciplined by the
WTO under these agreements, and this has been a successful strategy in the disputes to date, in
part. In October 2017, the EU informed the WTO that it had adopted Implementing Regulation
(EU) 2017/1578 to fully implement the AB‟s decision regarding Argentinian soybeans. While
Argentina welcomed this development, it also expressed its serious concern with the European
Biodiesel Board‟s intention to petition the European Commission to initiate a subsidy
investigation of Argentinian biofuel imports in order to avoid cheaper imports from Argentina
and Indonesia due to the lowering of ADA duties under (EU) 2017/1578.207 In relation to the
second dispute, on 1 March 2018 the EU and Indonesia informed the WTO that they had agreed
a reasonable period for the EU to implement the Panel‟s decision as 8 months, expiring on 28
October 2018. However in 2017, a decision was taken by the US Department of Commerce to
impose large anti-dumping duties on biofuel imports from both Argentina and Indonesia,
effectively protecting US biofuel producers.208 It is unclear whether Argentina and/or Indonesia
will bring a WTO dispute against the US based on this decision. In 2016 Peru imposed
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antidumping duties on Argentinian biofuels, and Argentina has submitted a request for
consultations with Peru.209
Despite WTO „wins‟ in disputes, unilateral action by the United States and Peru could
render the Argentinian biofuels industry nonviable.210 Given these developments, protectionist
disputes in the biofuels arena may continue for some time, and differential export tariffs may in
reality not provide a benefit to developing countries given the domestic actions of the EU and
US, until fresh disputes have made their way through the DSM.211 This means that biofuel
exporting countries may not benefit from a decline in the DSM, and are more economically
vulnerable to unilateral trade measures. Where biofuels do not have beneficial climate impacts,
this strategic compliance, this time largely by developed countries, may not be all bad for the
climate.
The interface between trade and climate change is at the heart of legal developments in
energy law,212 and this relationship, and these particular disputes, are understudied. Dent notes
that left unchecked, governance deficiencies in the trade-climate nexus could constrain the
potential for trade to expand clean energy technologies worldwide, 213 which would lead to
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211
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negative consequences for the climate. Poor outcomes in these energy disputes and the current
approach of the DSM to Article XX means the WTO may not be an appropriate forum to
adjudicate energy disputes in the context of climate change. A move away from multilateralism
in the climate context may not be a bad thing in the short term. In the longer term, a better
synergy between the WTO and the goals of the Paris Agreement will be needed in order to avoid
catastrophic climate change and ensure a more cohesive global strategy to increase the diffusion
of renewable energy.
The regime complex of climate change means that several narrow regimes exist which
concern climate change, without a clear hierarchy among the regimes. 214 Keohane and Victor
note that while regime complexes can have dysfunctional tendencies, there may exist flexibilities
across issues, and adaptability over time. 215 Adopting more climate-friendly interpretations of
Article XX is not outside the bounds of the history of the DSM. Facing significant criticism in
the 1990s, the DSM developed more flexible interpretations of Article XX(b) and (g) that could
better cater for domestic policy priorities such as health and the environment. 216 These are now
considered valuable policy norms in the WTO, and climate change and related clean energy
policies should benefit from similar treatment.
Conversely, not adopting a more generous approach to priorities such as climate change
and cleaner energy, would put the WTO in conflict with the Paris Agreement and latter
agreement‟s expectations that countries progressively ratchet up their ambition over time in
nationally determined contributions. In the absence of WTO legislative responses on energy, the
inability of the DSM to recognize and prioritise climate change and sustainable developmental
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aims is likely to further erode confidence in the WTO system, particularly on the part of
developing countries and especially emerging economies, and leave all parties vulnerable to
evasive and non-compliant behaviour, as well as trade remedies. This may have negative
consequences both for climate change mitigation as well as for the development trajectories of
developing countries and multilateralism in the longer term.
The flexibility and adaptability of the DSM has been identified as one way for the WTO
to navigate through its current impasse of the Doha Round, 217 and could also be a method to
forge a more compatible relationship between trade and climate change. Relying on the
“generative quality”218 of the DSM, this paper suggests two complementary approaches which
could be adopted to smooth the conflict between green industrial policy making in the energy
area and existing WTO jurisprudence.
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES
A number of contextual interpretations of WTO law and lessons can be gleaned from
these disputes. Most importantly, energy disputes are escalating at the WTO, despite its declining
prominence as a multilateral institution and attempts to paralyse the DSM by the United States.
While there may be a „pause‟ in disputes in the short term, if the WTO and DSM are
reinvigorated, energy disputes are likely to continue. There is an increasing diversity of
complainants and respondents in these disputes, and now both developed and developing
countries‟ policies are in play, with emerging economies now suing developed and developing
countries over their domestic policy making.
There is a trend of unsuccessful employment of Article XX by developing countries,
illustrating that Article XX tends to protect conservation-only policies. Therefore, green
217
218
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industrial policy which is tinged with both environmental and infant-industry or other domestic
protection elements is likely to be unsuccessful, particularly under Article XX unless empirical
evidence linking protectionist measures to emissions reductions is provided. Strategic
compliance by developing countries as a result may mean that they will be more able to
implement domestic protectionist policies around energy. Provided these policies are well
designed and implemented and focus on increased manufacture and diffusion of renewable
energy, this may not be all bad for the climate in the short term.
The picture looks slightly different in the biofuels disputes where developing countries
were successful in the DSM, but their legal successes are being undermined by convenient
compliance or evasion by developed countries. Developing countries are being denied reliance
on comparative advantages in natural resources, and also not being able to defend their
development trajectories within the WTO system. However, as the climate benefits of biofuels
can be questionable, particular those based on palm oil, unilateral measures adopted may not be
as negative for the climate as the measures adopted in relation to solar and wind technology.
These biofuels unilateral measures may stymie the growth of these industries and therefore
consequentially slow deforestation rates. Overall, however, strategic or convenient compliance
strategies by developing countries, is likely to continue as countries carve out green industrial
policy space by manoevering around WTO rules and dispute outcomes where that is financially
feasible.
A. Lessons Learned – Strategic Compliance
The analysis shows that developing countries are already using strategic compliance
approaches to protect domestic development agendas and create more policy-space for
themselves in a trade-restrictive world. With many developing countries containing the world‟s
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largest stores of raw materials, they can be perceived as the new „Renewable Superpowers‟.219
These countries may even form an „OPEC for Renewables‟, 220 signalling that global wrangling
for dominance in these new industries is likely to continue. The largely negative outcomes for
developing countries in energy disputes means that they are likely to continue to employ
strategic compliance approaches. Given the potential role of developing countries in the global
expansion of renewables, this may not be all bad given the seeming inability of the DSM at the
moment to take into account the urgency of the climate crisis. This is due to the WTO‟s
emphasis on reducing protectionism and stressing non-discrimination in trade relationships –
rules which to date have largely benefited industrialized developed countries.
Existing trade disciplines under the WTO fail to take into account development
trajectories and energy access issues of developing countries, but also fail to cater for the climate
mitigation impacts of domestic policies. Neither the WTO nor the DSM was established to cater
comprehensively for non-trade concerns, and policy space provided by Article XX was always
anticipated to be strongly trade-oriented. Weiss argues that through the multilateral trading
system, wealthy nations have carved out a multilateral order that best suits their own
development trajectory.221 OECD countries have used high-technology capacities and innovative
technologies as the foundation of their national prosperity.222 She argues that member states
which are seeking to build an industry or an export advantage will find scope to manoeuvre
severely disciplined and conditioned by multilateral agreements such as the SCM Agreement,
TRIMS and TRIPS.223 Developing countries have remained primarily exporters of natural
219
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resources. As a result, traditional trading patterns reflect the export of commodities and natural
resources by developing countries, and the import of technology and services. 224 By intertwining
development and environmental policies, developing countries are attempting to scale the value
chain, and avoid the „Dutch disease‟; increased revenues from natural resources can deindustrialize a nation‟s economy by raising the exchange rate and thereby making its
manufacturing sector less competitive. 225 This can trap developing countries into a state of
“underdevelopment” due to over reliance on natural resource exports.226
Large developing countries such as China and India are attempting to break these
traditional trade patterns by processing raw materials and minerals before export, attempting a
“collective correction by developing countries to their past development path.”227 Production
taxes or quotas can be the first-best policy instrument to address this, but risks what the WTO
has called “natural resource nationalism” and “beggar thy neighbour” trading asymmetries. 228
Developing countries have attempted to address this issue through policies which combine both
environmental considerations as well as domestic protectionism. 229 These policies have largely
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been declared incompatible with WTO rules through energy disputes. In the trade context,
failures by developing countries in energy disputes is not surprising where the disputes revolve
around green industrial policies.
As these disputes move into their trade remedy phases, it seems that developing countries
are choosing to retain their green industrial policies and adopt strategic or convenient compliance
approaches to WTO rulings, or as Wu and Saltzman note, looking for WTO loopholes or
inconsistencies,230 particularly where they do not feel their domestic goals under the policies
have yet to be achieved. This has been demonstrated in the China-Wind and India-Solar disputes.
Prompt compliance results only when developmental aims have been achieved, as illustrated in
the China-Wind consultations. The lack of involvement of small or medium sized developing
countries as either complainant or respondent in these disputes confirms this trend. These
countries tend not to be as active in the DSM, and even if they were, it is only large developing
countries that can afford to engage in strategic compliance strategies.
Developed countries appear to be adopting similar protectionist approaches, particularly
in the US-Countervailing Duties and biofuels disputes, caving to pressure from their own
domestic industries. Under the biofuels disputes, developing countries are therefore being denied
access to markets even when their domestic policies are WTO compliant. There is nothing much
that can be done about this behaviour except to pursue trade remedies at the international level,
or attempt to resolve the issue through diplomacy. It appears, then, that where countries can
afford to withstand the imposition of trade remedies, they will choose to continue to retain tradeinconsistent clean energy policies, at least until they have achieved domestic aims.
In the short term, a strategic compliance approach may be beneficial for the climate if
developing countries use this policy space to increase manufacture and diffusion of renewable
230
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energy technology that has climate benefits, particularly domestically. It is widely acknowledged
that China‟s domestic industrial approach to clean energy technology such as solar and wind has
been responsible for the reduction in price of these technologies globally, leading to price parity
with fossil fuels. 231 This development can only be positive for global climate stabilization goals.
However, China is a unique player due to its scale and size, and not all protectionist policies are
good for the climate. For example, the climate benefits of biofuels has been hotly contested and
so protectionist measures adopted by developed countries in the biofuels area where domestic
policies of developing countries are WTO-compliant but climate-unfriendly may also be
beneficial.
In the long term, however, more synergy between the trade and climate regimes should
be found. Trade remedies in response to multilateral disputes can include tariff increases and
other trade-restrictive measures in order to counter the alleged injury caused by a subsidy. Other
parties could take unilateral action as well in the face of a stasis at the DSM. 232Recent
protectionist policies by the US through import tariffs are anticipated to increase the price of
solar panels. 233 It is estimated that between 2008-2012, trade remedies affected US$32 billion
worth of trade in green products.234 Unilaterally imposed anti-dumping or countervailing duties
to counter domestic subsidies lead to more expensive products and import barriers,235 and so a
stable and fair trading system in renewable energy which have demonstrated climate benefits is
231
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needed in the longer term. In the longer term, synergy between the WTO and the goals of the
Paris Agreement would lead to a more cohesive and mutually supportive global trade and climate
strategy.
While the DSM did incorporate customary international law in some disputes, it did so
narrowly, and almost discounted the importance of the UNFCCC regime in its interpretive
approaches. Leal-Arcas and Filis argue that as the climate crisis increases, global imperatives
such as climate mitigation may either regulate how WTO norms are applied or in some cases
even displace those norms. 236 This movement has yet to occur based on the current set of energy
disputes analysed. Alternative approaches are available and set out below. In the longer term, it
will be important for the WTO to both engage in legislative reform and adopt climate-compatible
approaches to Article XX. While legislative reform such as adding a no-action category of
subsidies under the SCM Agreement, or political decisions through a climate waiver would be a
much more comprehensive approach, they may be politically unfeasible to achieve in the short
term. Given the required urgent in emissions mitigation, and the need for dramatically scaled up
action in the next decade, a two-fold jurisprudential approach is suggested below as a partial
solution.
B. Future Strategies: Reinterpreting Article XX
Energy and trade are two separate regimes, and a future framework agreement on energy
at the WTO would provide far more legal coherence in this area. 237 Given the current lacklustre
progress of the Doha Development Round a new trade agreement is unlikely to be agreed
anytime soon. A number of authors have suggested a „climate waiver‟ or the re-introduction of
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non-actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement, and the successful conclusion of the EGA
negotiations. 238 Member states can adopt an authoritative interpretation of provisions of the
WTO Agreements, for example in a declaration that measures taken pursuant to the Paris
Agreement would fall within the scope of Article XX, or to negotiate a „peace clause‟ providing
a cooling off period before challenging national climate measures.239 Farah and Gima suggest the
incorporation of a sunset clause or period of transition to allow developing countries to achieve a
level of development in clean energy fields. 240 These strategies would all provide a more
comprehensive approach to trade and climate change and may be successful if global priority and
attention is focused on reinvigorating the WTO. However, given the current stasis of legislative
reform at the WTO, it may take some time to reach political agreement. In the interim, a
jurisprudential approach may be an appropriate stop gap and raise the profile of climate change
as both an important and legitimate policy objective of the WTO.241
Reliance on Article XX by developing countries has been wholly unsuccessful in these
energy disputes since 2010, and not all defences available under Article XX were used by these
countries. In addition, DSM interpretations of these provisions have excluded issues of
sovereignty, health or development, and narrowed interpretations of Article XX. Public health
concerns, under XX(b), which are traditionally afforded a large dose of respect by the DSM,
were unsuccessful in these disputes. Regulatory autonomy for the transition to renewable energy
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under Article XX(d) was disregarded given the lack of specificity and bindingness in both
international and domestic law. Green industrial policy was too protectionist to be favoured
under Article XX(g), which was confined to environmental conservation only. 242 Finally, the
DSM was not amenable to energy access and energy poverty arguments under Article XX(j).243
A number of approaches are suggested below which could be adopted by developing countries
under these subcategories to overcome these obstacles.
1. Article XX(b)
Public health concerns were not run by either India or China in the context of climate
change in these disputes. This is surprising as both of these countries are struggling with high
pollution levels primarily due to the burning of fossil fuels. 244 The transition to clean energy
could be cited in domestic policy documents as contributing to the resolution of mounting public
health concerns, particularly air pollution, with the requisite data and empirical connections to
both health concerns and reduced emissions provided. Rich jurisprudence in both the BrazilRetreaded Tyres and EC-Asbestos245 provides countries with large policy discretion when it
comes to public health priorities, provided comprehensive domestic objectives are clearly
articulated and carefully linked to justify any trade-restrictive elements. This avenue could
provide more policy space to developing countries in the context of climate change if specific
links are made to domestic health concerns. These health issues could also be linked to energy
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access and energy poverty issues, providing a multilayered approach to justify increasing the
diffusion of renewable energy.
The applicability of Article XX(b) requires a reference to how measures are linked to
environmental or public health objectives, and general references to these objectives is unlikely
to be successful without more detailed domestic policies on emissions and pollution reduction, as
well as data linking fossil fuel use to air pollution and associated respiratory diseases. 246 If
countries do this, limited room to manoeuvre could be opened up through the employment of
public health considerations due to climate change and air pollution. Given historic policy space
provided to countries in the realm of public health, if argued robustly Article XX(b) may provide
some relief, provided the tests in the chapeau can be cleared.247
2. Articles XX(d) and XX(j)
These energy disputes also provide legal interpretations of a number of provisions under
both Article XX (d) and (j). In the India-Solar dispute, the DSM demonstrated limited concern
for energy access and energy sustainability considerations under these provisions. Arguments
regarding energy poverty and/or climate change in the context of Article XX(j) were not
considered. Energy access arguments were considered, but only briefly by the Panel. Arguably
energy poverty issues are folded in to energy access, but the Panel provided scant attention to
this argument and the need for access to clean energy for development purposes. Instead, the
Panel focused on trade concerns, unable to find a link between reduced domestic production of
renewable energy and reduced imports.

As such, the Panel concluded that India‟s green
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industrial policy was as much about boosting domestic industry as it was about filling growing
domestic energy demand.
Here, the DSM was not willing to consider international climate change agreements as
qualifying under Article XX(d) without a specific degree of bindingness of renewable energy
provisions. Hortatory, domestic policy-based language was clearly not sufficient to qualify under
Article XX(d). This requirement of „hard normativity‟ by the DSM ignores the soft law elements
of the climate change governance regime, including the Paris Agreement, and its emphasis on
nationally determined contributions and progression of national ambition on climate change
mitigation targets over time. Accelerated action under the Paris Agreement is likely to trigger
more trade law challenges to domestic policy-making without sufficient recourse to Article
XX.248 In this regard, developing countries should consider tighter language in national policies
with closer and more explicit links to climate change and their nationally determined
contributions regarding clean energy transitions, with discretion provided to cater for energy
poverty issues in order to provide stronger normativity, targets and action at the domestic level.
Article XX(d) may also provide some assistance if developing countries are willing to tighten the
language of domestic policy directives and legislation, linking clean energy policies more
directly to public health, domestic environmental concerns and nationally determined
contributions under the Paris Agreement.
3. Article XX (g)
Domestic measures and policies were scrutinized by the DSM to determine whether they
met the even-handedness requirement under Article XX(g). While parity between foreign and
domestic measures may not be necessary, some activity on the domestic front towards
248
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conservation will be necessary to qualify for Article XX(g). This could be achieved through
closer integration between, say the establishment of production quotas and export duties, and the
direct application of export duties or licence fees to environmental conservation and remediation.
The DSM has narrowly confined the application of Article XX(g) to conservation only measures.
As currently interpreted, the development of green industrial policies which seek a broader
development scope beyond conservation are unlikely to be palatable to the DSM without this
being raised at the appellate body level in the future, and more deference provided to well
designed, climate-friendly domestic policies. Green industrial policies with domestic economic
elements and an export focus are unlikely to succeed, given recent jurisprudence under Article
XX(g), unless stringent domestic measures are also undertaken. This approach could align with
the Article XX(d) strategy suggested above, with progressive domestic emissions reductions
combined

with

strict

environmental

procedures

implemented

domestically.

Linking

environmental export tariffs directly to fund environmental remediation and clean energy
policies may also illicit more positive consideration by the DSM.
These recommendations all have sweeping domestic costs and regulatory implications for
developing countries, and movement cannot only be one way on this issue. Whether these
countries demonstrate an appetite to cater their domestic landscapes more closely to trade
compliance, or simply continue with strategic or non-compliant behaviour to achieve their green
industrial policy goals, remains to be seen. The outcome of energy disputes to date indicates
strategic and non-compliance is the more likely outcome, unless more progressive interpretation
of Article XX is undertaken at the DSM.
4. Article XX Chapeau
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Despite the suggested strategies, even if a measure succeeds under a sub-provision of
Article XX, it must still prevail under the chapeau test, which contains strict guidance on trade
distorting elements of a measure. These recent energy disputes demonstrate that no matter the
environmental objective or effect, as long as a policy violates a trade obligation, the
environmental policy will likely encounter some issues under the chapeau.249 While some
progressive interpretation of the chapeau has come before, and robust arguments could be put
forward about the multilateral negotiations under the Paris Agreement to meet the procedural
elements of the chapeau, any trade distorting element of a renewable energy policy may struggle
to survive the chapeau.
Policy space for developing countries to scale the value chain in clean energy is therefore
not likely to be tolerated by the DSM with current interpretive approaches to Article XX. Wu
and Saltzman note this is not a real difficulty for the environment as the trade distorting elements
of these policies can be separated from the environmental aspects. 250 However, this approach
may cause difficulties for some developing countries, depending on their fiscal situation, and
developing countries may want to use protectionist measures to grow and expand their industries.
This may particularly be the case with export duties which can provide direct financial benefits,
including increasing the financial capacity of the Government for environmental remediation. 251
Fiscal constraints in developing countries may lead them to dump costly environmental policies
without domestic protection mechanisms and direct development gains.252 Increased domestic
development of clean technologies in the country the size of China can have international
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positive spill-over effects through climate mitigation, which strict environmental policies
divorced from development gains could undermine.253
Climate change mitigation considerations barely figured in these energy disputes, and
climate change itself was not mentioned at all by the DSM, illustrating its focus only on trade
distorting measures. This indicates that alternative interpretations of the chapeau of Article XX
would also have to be adopted by the DSM, taking into account the urgency of climate change.
Some general principles and interpretive approaches could be adopted by the DSM. In the first
instance, climate change could be considered by the DSM as a legitimate policy imperative,
which in some circumstances could balance or negate any trade distorting measure. A more
balanced approach giving equal consideration to both the climate protection effects of measures
and trade discrimination could be adopted by the DSM. As articulated in section I above, the
DSM regularly adopts weighing and balancing tests when assessing the appropriateness of
domestic policies in the context of trade rules and discriminatory treatment. Secondly, where a
domestic policy has overwhelming climate benefits which significantly outweigh any
discriminatory treatment (even through export), the DSM should allow it. This may require more
comprehensive analysis on the impacts of measures both in terms of climate benefits (arguably
more difficult to assess in the export context) and trade distortive impacts.
In order to do this, a different interpretive approach to the chapeau of Article XX needs to
be adopted which harkens back to older and more progressive interpretations adopted by the
DSM in the environment disputes. Trade distortive measures, provided they are closely
connected to legitimate climate policy objectives, should be assessed for their climate-legitimacy
and where there are clear, demonstrated climate benefits, allowed. In this balancing test, the
DSM would provide deference to legitimate climate policy making which has demonstrated
253
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health and environmental effects. In order to do this, more climate and energy experts needs to
be appointed on to the Panels and Appellate Bodies. The DSM has a history of progressive
interpretive approaches to Article XX, giving due deference to coherent and comprehensive
domestic policies in the areas of public health and natural resource conservation. This
interpretive approach should be applied to domestic climate and energy policies, particularly
when they are clearly and cogently applied, and empirically proven to support public health,
resource conservation and climate aims.

CONCLUSION
The year 2020 may prove a critical one for the efficacy of the multilateral trading system,
at least in the short term, as well as for the Paris Agreement.254 If the WTO is undermined due to
stasis at the appellate body level, it is likely that countries will revert to strategic compliance and
protectionist measures, as well as rely on bilateral or regional trade agreements where they exist.
If the WTO is revived in the future, its approach to climate change should be significantly
revamped. As Huber notes, in moments of disruption and crisis there is opportunity for
significant change and transitional relief. 255 There is no doubt that we are now facing a climate
crisis, and the relationship between the WTO and the Paris Agreement needs to be significantly
revised.
Given the current inability of developing countries to rely on Article XX in energy
disputes, their policy options are limited. They can either remove the economic portions of their
green industrial policies, or seek to manoeuvre around WTO rules through strategic compliance
measures and simply bear any trade remedies that may be imposed. The recent spate of new
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tariffs being imposed internationally and stasis at the Appellate Body level, means that the
existing strategic compliance approach is likely to continue. This may have both positive and
negative impacts on the clean energy trade.
In the short term, strategic compliance and the decline of multilateralism could benefit
emerging economies if they use this policy space to increase the manufacture and diffusion of
renewable energy through policies which are well designed, properly implemented and have
significant climate benefits. In the area of biofuels, protectionist measures by developed
countries are detrimental to emerging economies, but may not be to the climate where biofuel
policies do not have climate benefits.
In the longer term, if the WTO revives as the main trading arena, renewable energy
disputes at the DSM are likely to escalate. This would have largely negative consequences for
developing countries given the jurisprudence developed to date. Developing countries require
greater recourse to sustainable development related exceptions than developed countries do, but
the DSM‟s energy jurisprudence is providing them with very little policy space which is WTOcompliant at the moment.256 In particular, the DSM‟s interpretation of Article XX dismisses
sustainable development as a legitimate policy tool,257 and the approach of the DSM and its
interpretation of Article XX should be revised.
The WTO itself needs to have a stronger voice in areas of major global concern,
including climate change.258 It is startling that none of these disputes mention the pressing global
issue of climate change, not even in the attempted application of Article XX(g) which is
specifically designed to provide domestic policy space on environmental issues. A stronger role
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of developing countries within the WTO is also key to its success. 259 Adopting a more climate
and sustainable development-friendly interpretation of Article XX provisions could achieve this
dual goal and result in a strengthened WTO system which is better adapted to the sustainable
development aims of many of its member states, as well as a progressive (instead of a regressive)
position on the critical issue of climate change. Trade can be used as a catalyst to bring together
regulators, civil society, business and energy industries to help shape domestic decarbonisation
policies that meet climate mitigation goals. 260 Developing countries are already an important
laboratory for public policy and green growth, and existing strategies show great potential for
simultaneous inclusive green growth and environmental protection. 261 Where these initiatives
have clear climate benefits, they should be fostered and encouraged by the WTO.
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